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FinTech -- along with the blockchain, other distributed ledger, smart contract, and 
tokenization usually assumed to accompany it -- could change the way governments 
procure goods and services. Procurement authorities and procurement law can play a vital 
role in the development of FinTech. They can help build the FinTech platforms and 
ecosystems that help them engage in public procurement. They should not try to procure 
such FinTech outright. At the national level, regulators should not just leave FinTech 
rulemaking up to financial regulators. Contracting authorities should not just develop or 
use their own selected FinTech applications willy-nilly. They should contribute to overall 
changes in procurement law - which extend far beyond simple supervisory or regulatory 
technologies (RegTech/SupTech). Governments should get serious about the Agreement 
on Government Procurement and similar treaties - by creating a new authority to help 
develop the law needed to put FinTech-enabled procurement platforms in place. China’s 
own world-leading FinTech and cross-border public procurements do not always 
contribute to a global level playing field. Any FinTech applications facilitating public 
procurement should thus encourage compliance with the procurement law legal principles 
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1. Multi-stakeholder commissions. FinTech regulation involves more than just financial 
(and especially banking) regulators. Other bodies, like centralized procurement agencies 
arranging for FinTech-enabled procurements, should have a voice at a multi-stakeholder 
commission, board or working group. Such a commission can also consider the policies 
aimed at avoiding anti-competitive behaviour -- like the mandatory sharing of 
algorithmic learning, subsidization of competitors, the temporary shutdowns of any 
FinTech platform developed or managed by the government and so forth.    
 
2. Independent, non-government procurement authorities? Private sector, 
technologists and financial experts will need some control over some aspects of senior-
level procurement policy/practice.  If public-private commissions can not oversee central 
procurement bodies, than ‘twin peaks’ style regulations may allow for private sector 
participation in a regulatory body, and civil servants in the market conduct bodies. Such 
bodies can also help decide on public versus private information on distributed ledgers 
like blockchains. They can also lead efforts in adopting, at the regulatory level, the 
UNCITRAL’s and other organizations’ work in on encouraging FinTech applications in 
areas such as receivables assignment, secured transactions, IP security rights and 
registries, and secured transactions. 
 
3. FinTech-regulation. Vest the central procurement agency or related body with the 
regulatory ability to mandate changes to the rules governing the ancillary parts of 
procurement where FinTech plays a role. Allow for explicit FinTech-related rulemaking 
(and do fast, given the delays in e-procurement). Even if national law does not allow for 
accepting tokens or ledger data as part of a contract, procurement rules (as repeated in 
procurement invitations and contracts) may allow agencies to use them.    
 
4. FinTech-based finance satisfying financial standing. Amend procurement 
legislation to allow bidders’ to use FinTech applications as a means of demonstrating 
economic and financial standing when submitting bids. Clearly, capacity for crowd-
finance or just-in-time funding should count as financial reserves to some extent.   
 
5. Recognize tokens and signed ledgers as legal. Legislators need to make explicit 
provision for digital information in procurement law (and preferably across the supply 
chain). Domestic legislation needs to recognize digitally secure information or tokens (in 
cryptographic/digital form) with the same legality as paper documents showing the 
movement in goods and money or the securitization of assets/liabilities.  
 
6. FinTech-ecosystems as in-house or outhouse -- not both. Procurement authorities 
seek to fund FinTech using pre-commercial procedures and otherwise ‘buy’ FinTech 
from existing market players. Yet, they also spend large amounts of money in-house, 
collaborating across public sector authorities to build FinTech ‘pilot’ projects. Running 
both systems (even if not concurrently) wastes money, competes against yourself, and 
hurts overall innovation.  
 
7. Procurement sandboxes. Do not let individual contracting authorities to run their own 
self-designed sandbox FinTech-enabled procurements. Agree as a procurement system 
which procurements will be tried, why -- and what is to be learned. Ensure bidders have 
full and fair disclosure of the experiment.  
 
8. Public-private partnership from blockchain to token. If governments are keen to 
conduct FinTech experiments, they may use the four technologies we discussed as 
‘FinTech-enabled’ to run a public-private partnership (PPP) under their own country’s 
procedure for such PPPs. Such a procurement doesn’t need to involve FinTech as the 
principle subject of the contract (like funding a motorway).  
 
9. Putting ‘subsidy tokens’ online. If FinTech support constitutes a ‘service of general 
economic interest’ then terms should be same as others -- namely with a calculation of 
the costs and benefits, the potential subsidization, and the transparent tracking of such 
‘advantage.’ Governments can use blockchains to monitor the way such quanftified 
advantages ‘filter’ across the economy.  
 
10. Insurer delight and caution. Make provision in procurement law (and insurance law 
if necessary) to allow for the mutualization of risks involved in procurement beyond 
contracting parties to beneficiaries. Unlike traditional insurance markets, many risks 
involve us all and will be cheaper to crowd-insure than rely on government as insurer-of-
last-resort.      
 
11. Traceable ‘taxes’. Authorize the payment of pilot project ‘taxes’ in cryptocurrency 
formats like any local currency, with local budget law providing potential carve-outs for 
FinTech pilots.    
 
12. National budget law review. Have the experts advising in the multi-stakeholder 
forum review the Budget Law with line-by-line proposals for introducing FinTech in 
future procurement budgeting. Such work can consist of procedures accounting for 
securitized assets, methods for accounting for Fin-Tech carve-out pilots in the general 
accounts, and reports assembled from data coming off of FinTech applications.     
 
13. Digital IDs for contracting authorities. Ensure that every contracting authority has 
a unique identification, wallet and other information to ensure consistent identification 
across platforms and to encourage future use in cryptographically signed applications.  
 
14. Several simple steps. Some countries may find a national referendum on FinTech in 
procurement, the adoption of an “innovation principle” into law, requirements for break-
points in decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), as well as PR work around 




1. No more FinTech in-house or external procurement funding for member state 
bodies. Bodies like the WEF, IADB, WB and others have increasingly participated in 
procuring FinTech services. Such procurements distort markets. Yet, building up FinTech 
expertise in their own organizations gives these people and project undo subsidies and 
advantages over those having to do this work outside the international organizations. A 
lot of such FinTech work is white-wash anyway.  
 
2. An International Public Procurement Authority (IPPA). Far less important policy 
areas get their own international secretariats. An international organization -- like the 
proposed IPPA -- should encourage FinTech development which is neutral to the market 
traditions of their member states and help establish a level playing field for all cross-
border procurement.   
 
3. Putting FinTech into International Procurement Law. Diplomats and treaty writers 
do not need to wait for the IPPA’s recommendations. Bodies like the UNCITRAL and 
the GPA working groups should write in FinTech now -- even if the final contours 
remain to be seen (like e-procurement from the 1990s). Other non-procurement work 
obviously includes the UNCITRAL’s work in receivables assignment, secured 
transactions, IP security rights and registries, and secured transactions. 
 
4. Get China on Board. Ensure China -- as the likely world leader in setting FinTech 
standards and applications for use in procurement at home and abroad -- participates in 
international fora setting FinTech standards and peer review. If we end up using Chinese 
technologies and procurement standards, ensure they respect the basics of our already 
developed procurement principles in procurements on our soil.  
 
5. Shame and discourage awards to overly aggressive proprietary standards. 
FinTech projects should use open architectures as well as open platforms. Do not 
grandfather in proprietary standards even for market leading blockchain or virtual asset 
(token) service providers of FinTech services.    
 
6. Leapfrog inefficient banking sectors. Many of the recommendations for domestic 
parties (above) will help encourage international public procurement. Having contracting 
authorities who can send directly (without the need for banks or even expensive 
administrative staff) payments via transparent ledgers can help lower costs and ensure 
project completion. FinTech can leapfrog/overtake the whole traditional “financial sector 
development” policies of the Bretton Woods institutions.  
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Financial technology (alternatively FinTech or Fintech) has become one of the earliest 
buzzwords of the 21st century.1 From threatening global banking to accomplishing the 
United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, authors and academics of all stripes 
extol the promise of FinTech everywhere.2 The use of information technologies have 
undoubtedly rationalized business processes and lowered transactions costs around all 
kinds of finance.3 These technologies may even create, participate in, or otherwise 
contribute to ‘ecosystems’ which reorganize consumption, distribution and production 
patterns in particular sectors -- including in high-volume, low-margin retail finance.4 Yet, 
FinTech differs from simple e-finance in the convergence of a set of technologies like 
blockchains, distributed ledgers, smart contracts, and crypto-assets -- often used on a 
platform or in combination. Such combinations form synergies which some talk about as 
a FinTech ecosystem.5 If widely adopted, such FinTech (if the word can encompass all 
these technologies) threatens/promises to remove dramatically financial intermediaries 
from finance.6 
 
Despite its economic importance, government procurement represents one of the most 
neglected areas of the FinTech craze. A few large banks and consulting firms have issued 
their own sales-dressed-as-analysis pieces online. These analyses look at how FinTech 
                                                 
1 The press and others often use the word as a stand-in for any kind of innovation involving blockchains 
and new technologies involving money or finance. We address the difficulty in defining the word -- and 
offer our own working definition -- subsequently. For an independent take on the difficulty in defining and 
using this word, see Liudmila Zavolokina, Mateusz Dolata and Gerhard Schwabe, The FinTech 
Phenomenon: Antecedents of Financial Innovation Perceived by the Popular Press, Financial Innovation 
2(16), 2016, available online.  
2 For one such view of FinTech as the cure-it-all for the modern era, see Juan Cortina Sergio Schmukler, 
The Fintech Revolution: A Threat to Global Banking?, World Bank Research & Policy Brief No. 14, 2018, 
available online.  
3 Allen and his co-authors are just a few who illustrate the digital revolution’s benefits for finance. See 
Franklin Allen, Xian Gu, and Julapa Jagtiani, A Survey of Fintech Research and Policy Discussion, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper 20-21, 2020, available online. 
4 The inclusion of millions or billions of individuals without bank/financial accounts represents an excellent 
side-benefit of the internet age. See Sofie Blakstad, Robert Allen, Ecosystem vs Egosystem and Revolution 
vs Evolution, In Sofie Blakstad and Robert Allen, FinTech Revolution: Universal Inclusion in the New 
Financial Ecosystem, 2020, available online. 
5 We will see later how many of FinTech’s benefits in a procurement setting rely on such platform-based or 
ecosystem-based approaches. Policymakers seek to make public procurement more innovative by procuring 
such ecosystems and innovation directly. See Willem van Winden and Luís Carvalho, Intermediation in 
[the] Public Procurement of Innovation: How Amsterdam’s Startup-in-Residence Programme Connects 
Startups to Urban Challenges, Research Policy 48(9), 2019, available online.  
6 Master Nakamoto said it best, as Bitcoin, “a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow 
online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution.” 
See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Self-Published White Paper, 
available online.  
will change and challenge public procurement.7 Instead of addressing the challenge 
directly, many government leaders have simply outsourced thinking about FinTech’s role 
in public procurement to start-ups and others. These senior government officials thus 
hope that market actors will do all the FinTech development (and thinking about its 
regulation) for them.8 In the process, these officials leave it up to FinTech firms 
themselves to define how FinTech will change finance, government, and public 
procurement.9 Philosophers may encourage any move away from government-
provisioned services as a win for humanitarian and social/economic rights.10 Yet, 
debating the legal issues after the market has already developed made such debates futile; 
as well as removes any possibility of creating markets which purely serve the public 
interest.11 
 
In this paper, I argue that governments -- and public procurement bodies in particular -- 
should not leave FinTech regulation to FinTech companies and associated bodies 
themselves. Instead, public procurement bodies should participate in the broader debate 
about regulating Fintech applications and services. Such participation should support 
generally internationally accepted public procurement principles - in regulation and in 
deed. Without some reasoned form of legal coordination or control, the existing 
approach to supporting FinTech would likely lead to a free-for-all -- making public 
procurements more expensive, less transparent, and more politicized. In that world, 
payments do not pass from one supplier to the next smoothly, rights over assets and 
obligations in supply chains remain uncertain, and risks third party manipulation of 
FinTech-related information technology across the whole-of-government.  
 
My thesis covers the following. The first part describes FinTech as the nexus of 
blockchains, distributed ledgers, smart contracts, and cryptographic assets. I describe how 
all these components could enter into a public procurement -- from start to finish. I also 
describe the benefits and risks posed by a system where FinTech applications operate 
in/with every stage of the public procurement process. I also describe how/why FinTech 
                                                 
7 For one example, see Steve Cheng, Matthias Daub, Axel Domeyer, and Martin Lundqvist, Using 
Blockchain to Improve Data Management in the Public Sector, McKinsey Brief, 2020, available online. For 
a more direct promise of change, see GEP, The Future of Procurement Technology Portable, Powerful, 
Pivotal, GEP White Paper, 2020, available online. 
8 We will see many examples of the international organizations, national governments (especially central 
banks) and others tendering research projects which require bidders to find ways for FinTech to usefully 
serve the government and its public procurements.   
9 The European Banking Authority (EBA) Roadmap makes such a follow-the-follower approach evident. 
The Roadmap encourages plenty of monitoring and using best practice - but does little to organize a 
regulatory approach. Worse yet, the EBA -- like most regulators -- only involves financial counterparts 
(ignoring the vast swaths of organizations that deal in trade finance/credit, financial guarantees used in 
procurements by bidders and so forth). See EBA, THE EBA’S Fintech Roadmap: Conclusions from the 
Consultation on the EBA’s Approach to Financial Technology, 2018, available online. 
10 See Kobina Hughes, Blockchain, The Greater Good, and Human and Civil Rights, Metaphilosophy 48(5), 
2017, 654-665, available online.  
11 Many legal scholars have complained that the lack of considered legal thought during the Internet’s 
development - and especially Google’s rapid rise to dominance over Internet search - has led to a worse 
Internet and a worse Internet law. See Emre Bayamlioglu and Ronald Leenes, The ‘Rule of Law’ 
Implications of Data-Driven Decision-Making: A Techno-Regulatory Perspective, Law, Innovation and 
Technology 10(2), 295-313, 2018, available online.  
can help uphold procurement principles -- as well as the way these principles can and 
should guide the way we legislate and incentivize the use of FinTech applications in the 
service of public procurement.  
 
The second section looks at the public procurement of FinTech. The section describes 
how governments procure FinTech services as a way of developing the very FinTech 
applications which might make for better, future public procurement. The public 
procurement of such FinTech services grapples with thorny legal issues - like whether the 
procurement a FinTech platform or ecosystem usable for future procurements violates the 
principles of non-discrimination, equal treatment, proportionality, transparency and other 
cherished procurement-related jurisprudence. Do FinTech services on computer networks 
represent services of a general economic interest, and thus fall outside of procurement 
rules like the European Union’s rules? If governments end up seeking to provide these 
general services -- do they constitute the trade-distorting state aid that many states seek to 
avoid?  
 
The third section describes the options for regulating FinTech’s use in procurement. I 
show how national procurement agencies can (try to) procure a public procurement 
FinTech ecosystem through their own regulatory powers or by statute. I also show how a 
free-for-all procurement regime would result (and has already resulted) in an 
uncompetitive FinTech environment in certain jurisdictions. I also show why the 
decentralized approach to regulation based in supervisory technologies or regulatory 
technologies (SupTech and RegTech respectively) will not solve the many problems 
arising from laissez-faire regulation. I show how a national approach to regulating 
FinTech-enabled procurement solves the coordination failures and potentially bad 
investments of the contracting agent (CA)-centric ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’ 
approach.  
 
The fourth section looks at FinTech’s promise to revitalize international public 
procurement law. FinTech applications and their supporting law could offer a boost to 
cross-border procurements conducted under the WTO’s General Procurement Agreement, 
the UNCITRAL Model Public Procurement Law, the rules used by multilateral 
development banks and others. Yet, the West needs to proactively put in place a level 
playing field across borders. With China’s growing influence, in FinTech as well as 
cross-border procurement under its Belt and Road (and other) initiatives, an international 
free-for-all could appear just as readily as the free-for-all predicted at the national level. 
Yet, agreements like the General Agreement on the Trade in Services (GATS) -- and 
especially provisions dealing with freedom to offer financial services across borders -- 
will likely shape cross-border FinTech in procurement far more than changes to the 
international procurement regime itself.    
 
The final section concludes by arguing for a close reading of procurement laws now, 
keeping in mind the way FinTech will help finance procurements (and the FinTech-
related applications/assets being procured). The current FinTech procurement free-for-all 
risks spending too much public money on distorting markets at home and abroad. A 
coordinated set of national rules governing which FinTech tools contracting agencies 
(CAs) can or can not use - and how they may or may not use them - seems sensible. The 
international procurement-related treaties and soft law can also ensure that governments 
do not harmfully compete with each other. The result of such competition would result in 
an international free-for-all where FinTech stymies international payments. Given 
China’s lead in FinTech and strong position in international procurement markets, other 
countries’ regulators should think now about ways of ensuring that the international 
FinTech regime does not entrench China’s relatively lax and self-serving procurement 
rules in global procurement law.    
 
The reader should keep a few caveats in mind when reading this analysis. First, this paper 
looks at public procurement, ignoring many of the important aspects of FinTech and the 
procurement regulations of the private sector.12 Second, I address the topic from the 
FinTech optimist’s point of view -- assuming that experts end up solving all the technical 
and other problems which might delay/stop FinTech from working ‘as advertised’ in the 
popular media. I take such an extreme view only to illustrate the general principles of 
using FinTech in public procurement more clearly. Such a view includes assuming the 
integrity, security and safety of such FinTech. I avoid discussing technical and related 
security issues, as such a discussion would offer little in the way of shedding light on 
procurement or finance.13 Third, I draw most of my examples from the EU Directives - 
picking and choosing from other examples at-will. The Directives harmonize with 
international rules like the UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement and thus 
many countries’ laws. The United States (US) represents one jurisdiction where such an 
assumption falls flat. I avoid discussing US law or practice, given its complexity.14 
Finally, I avoid talking about specific FinTech companies or platforms (like BitCoin, 
ScienceSoft, or AliPay). We wish to talk about general policy issues - rather than the 
specific and potentially ephemeral companies making news in any particular month or 





                                                 
12 For readers unfamiliar with public procurement, see Abby Semple, A Practical Guide to Public 
Procurement, Oxford: OUP, 2015. See Prier, E. and McCue, C.P. The implications of a muddled definition 
of public procurement, Journal of Public Procurement 9(3/4): 326-370, 2009, available online. For those 
curious about the finance of such procurement, see Bernardo Nicoletti, Procurement Finance: The Digital 
Revolution in Commercial Banking, Palgrave, 2018.   
13 I accept that such security issues bedevil even simpler efforts toward digitizing procurement processes. 
For readers interested in some of the problems, see Ganesh Vaidyanathan, Sarv Devaraj and John D'Arcy, 
Does Security Impact E‐procurement Performance? Testing a Model of Direct and Moderated Effects, 
Decision Sciences 43(3), 437-458, 2012, available online. 
14 Such a decision represents an unfortunate and unavoidable necessity. Unfortunate, as many of the most 
interesting FinTech-related developments come from the US. Moreover, Part 32 of the US Federal 
Acquisition Regulation presents the rules around procurement finance far more clearly and directly than 
those in similar EU law. Such well-defined regulations make the task of transitioning to new technologies 
easier. See K. Cory, C. Coggeshall, J. Coughlin, and C. Kreycik., Solar Photovoltaic Financing: 
Deployment by Federal Government Agencies, National Renewable Energy Lab Report NREL/TP-6A2-
46397, 2009, available online.    
Why FinTech for Public Procurement? 
 
The Four Aspects of Our Working Definition of FinTech?  
 
Few can even agree on the working definition of FinTech -- much less discuss how such 
technology fits into financial service or public service provision. Authors like Schueffel 
trawl decades of the literature, finally concluding that, “Fintech is a new financial 
industry that applies technology to improve financial activities.”15 Yet, what constitutes 
“financial activities”? For many, FinTech encompasses the automation of payment 
systems, the use of new payment means (like cryptocurrencies), new ways individuals 
and companies lend directly to each other on digital platforms, the offer of insurance in 
similar ways, and so forth. 16 Behind most definitions lie the assumption that FinTech 
represents a complement or substitute to traditional financial services sectors.17  
 
Those working in the public sector see FinTech as something far more important.   
The blockchains often associated with FinTech represent the potentially truly 
revolutionary aspect of FinTech. Such blockchains -- or chains of data which store 
information about various aspects of a transaction or interaction with such information -- 
promise to rationalize public service provision.18 National Savings and Investment (NS&I) 
-- a UK government service -- crows about FinTech’s potential to revolutionize public 
service provision.19 Users of FinTech applications can use one-stop payment systems, 
have access to a range of financial information across ministries and agencies, and save, 
invest or transfer money electronically.20 
 
For our purposes, “FinTech” refers to four aspects of the evolving and slowly condensing 
debate about the use of financial technologies. First, blockchains serve as the basis on 
which much of the FinTech literature is based. Such blockchains simply represent ledgers 
or ‘strings’ of information which can record anything --from citizens’ health and 
                                                 
15 If Schueffel provides a definition culled carefully from academia, Rupeika-Apoga and Thalassinos in 
particular, cover the definitions used in much of the international organisation and policy literature (ie non-
academic literature). See Patrick Schueffel, Taming the Beast: A Scientific Definition of Fintech, Journal 
of Innovation Management 4(4), 2016, 32-54, at 32, available online. See also Ramona Rupeika-Apoga and 
Eleftherios Thalassinos, Ideas for a Regulatory Definition of FinTech, International Journal of Economics 
and Business Administration 8(2), 2020: 136-154, available online. 
16 See Anjan Thakor, Fintech and Banking: What Do We Know?,Journal of Financial Intermediation 41, 
2020, available online. 
17 See Rebel Cole, Douglas Cumming, and Jon Taylor, Does FinTech Compete with or Complement Bank 
Finance?, SSRN Working Paper 3302975, 2019, available online. 
18 The reader interested in learning about the links between blockchains and finance can sit the MIT online 
course on the topic. See Gary Gensler, Blockchain and Money, MIT Course Openware, 2018, available 
online. 
19 For example, see Unnamed Author, Public Finances: The Power of Fintech in Service Delivery, Global 
Government Forum Website, available online.   
20 Indeed, the NS&I website totes its saving and investing functions. The state-owned NS&I -- formerly the 
UK’s Post Office Savings Bank -- encourages UK citizens to save and help finance the UK’s debt. Such a 
prized position among financial institutions gives its Fintech offerings a potential advantage, as discussed 
later in this paper.   
employment history -- to their financial transactions.21 Their potential has encouraged 
authors from the European Commission and elsewhere to reorient public services around 
blockchains.22 Such blockchains have their inevitable uses in public procurement as 
well.23 Second, if users or interested third-parties share these blockchains and their 
information, they represent distributed ledgers. Blockchains simply represent one kind 
of distributed ledger - and FinTech can involve more than one type of such distributed 
ledger technology.24 Such distributed ledgers thus hope to complete the idea of the 
paperless office started in the e-procurement days -- with copies of forms or other 
information going out and coming in digitally…as needed.25 
 
The final two of the four FinTech aspects represent the most exciting and challenging. 
Third, the aforementioned blockchains may include smart contracts. Such smart 
contracts make the recording, or any transaction on the blockchain, contingent on some 
event which can be automatically and digitally monitored. For example, such smart 
contracts may ensure compliance with tendering terms, automatically assign evaluation 
scores and even allow consortia to engage in project planning with much of the 
monitoring and verification done electronically.26 Fourth, and finally, the creation, 
transfer and digital securitization of assets and liabilities allow cryptographically secured 
assets -- or tokenization -- to replace ownership stakes, debts, or any other kind of value 
previously noted on paper (like deeds, IOUs and even paper money itself).27 Any asset, 
                                                 
21 For more on the technical aspects of blockchains -- like their security or confidentiality -- in a public 
sector context, see Steve Cheng, Matthias Daub, Axel Domeyer, and Martin Lundqvist, Using Blockchain 
to Improve Data Management in the Public Sector, McKinsey Brief, available online. 
22 See David Allessie, Maciej Sobolewski and Lorenzino Vaccari, Blockchain for Digital Government: An 
Assessment of Pioneering Implementations [sic] in Public Services, European Commission Joint Research 
Centre Working Paper 115049, 2019, available online. 
23 Somasundaram and Hasan provide an excellent overview of electronic procurement and the way 
blockchains will likely change such procurement. See Ramanathan Somasundaram and Quamrul Hasan, 
Development of a Global e-Government Procurement Architecture using Blockchain Technology, Asian 
Development Bank Technical Report 47192-001, 2018, available online. 
24 For authors like Mainelli and Smith, such ledgers can contain know-your-customer information, 
insurance, or any other information the sharer sees fit to share. These attributes make distributed ledgers 
perfect for recording transactions. Sanchez, though, provides readers with a particularly disheartening view 
of distributed ledger technologies in government (public) procurement. See Michael Mainelli and Mike 
Smith, Sharing Ledgers for Sharing Economies: An Exploration of Mutual Distributed Ledgers (aka 
Blockchain Technology), Journal of Financial Perspectives 3(3), 2015, available online. See also Sergi 
Sanchez, The Implementation of Decentralised Ledger Technologies for Public Procurement: Blockchain 
Based Smart Public Contract, European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 14, 180, 
2019, available online. 
25 See Damle Pramod, Benjamin Zachariah, Tina Salim, Moving Beyond Paperwork: Blockchain in Public 
Sector, Telecom Business Review 12(1), 2019, 50-55, available online. 
26 Debono provides more on these contracts in a procurement setting. While these possibilities exist -- 
authors like Allam have raised suspicions about all these capabilities, given smart contracting is still under-
developed and an untested technology. See Pauline Debono, Transforming Public Procurement Contracts 
into Smart Contracts, International Journal of Information Technology Project Management 10(2), 2019, 
available online. See also Zaheer Allam, On Smart Contracts and Organisational Performance: A Review 
of Smart Contracts through the Blockchain Technology, Review of Economic and Business Studies 11(2), 
2019, available online. 
27 Few jurisdictions have tried to define -- much less regulate -- these financial products. For an example of 
a jurisdiction currently moving forward, see Hui Huang, Demin Yang, and Fai-Yang Loo, The 
commodity, or real world object can have a digital claim attached to it -- making the 
transfer of ownership or other rights and obligations easier.28 Owners can even tokenize 
commodities, as long as they can be tagged with some kind of identifier.29  
 
All together -- blockchains, distributed ledgers, smart contracts and tokenization -- 
represent the applications analyzed under the rubrique of FinTech.30 FinTech-enabled 
public procurement refers to the use of these technologies when dealing with the 
transfer of information. Such information may include information about goods and 
services themselves, and not exclusively about the monetary movements underlying a 
public procurement.31  
 
FinTech’s Application to Public Procurement 
 
Many authors have claimed that the FinTech-related technologies discussed above can 
help transform public procurement.32 For Maltaverne, such transformations include the 
streamlining of procurements, making them more transparent, and reducing broader risks 
to the entire procurement sector.33 Headlines like those announced by  FinTech Futures 
portend promising collaborations between FinTechs like BlueVine (a finance provider to 
SMEs delivering on government procurements) and GovQuote (a US platform listing 
new procurements opportunities).34 The Seoul district has reportedly used blockchains for 
public procurement activities.35 Van der Peijl and his team have noted how blockchains 
have helped organisations like the US Department of Human Health match thousands of 
payers and service providers -- ensuring that only authorized payees receive invoices, as 
well as the correct and almost instantaneous processing of payments.36   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Development and Regulation of Cryptoassets: Hong Kong Experiences and a Comparative Analysis, 
European Business Organization Law Review 21, 319–347, 2020, available online.  
28 See Iota Kaousar Nassr, The Tokenisation of Assets and Potential Implications for Financial Markets, 
OECD, 2020, available online. 
29 See Charles Okaformbah, Blockchain Tokenisation in a B2B Trade Finance Supply-Chain Sector, 
Medium, 2018, available online. 
30 Many miss tokenization as a part of the larger transformation of the public sector. For one example, see 
Jason Killmeyer, Mark White and Bruce Chew, Will Blockchain Transform the Public Sector?, Deloitte 
Press, 2017, available online. 
31 See also Kishor Vaidya and John Campbell, Multidisciplinary Approach to Defining Public E-
Procurement and Evaluating its Impact on Procurement Efficiency, Information Systems Frontiers 18: 333–
348, 2016, available online. 
32 Many advocates for using FinTech in procurement -- and particularly in settling accounts between the 
range of participants in such a procurement -- come from non-academic sources. See Alex Hales, How 
Blockchain is Transforming the Future of Finance? PaymentsJournal, 2019, available online.  
33 Bertrand Maltaverne, What Can Blockchain Do for Public Procurement?, Public Spend Forum, 2018, 
available online.  
34 See FinTech Futures, BlueVine and GovQuote team up to fund SMEs, FinTech Futures Web Page, 2019, 
available online. 
35 Ledger Insights, Seoul District Using Blockchain for Public Procurement, 2019, available online. 
36 Sebastiaan van der Peijl, George O’Neill, Laura Doumbouya, Victoria Howlett, and Joao de Almeida, 
Study on the Up-Take of Emerging Technologies in Public Procurement, Framework Contract DI/07624-
ABC IV Lot 3 Final Report, 2020, at p. 109.  
How might FinTech technologies enter at each stage of the procurement process? 37   
Figure 1 shows how FinTech might change aspects of public procurement.38 I can not 
describe every single point.39 However, some issues stand out more than others. For 
example, FinTech can encourage the collection of specific taxes or obligatory financial 
contributions toward some social/public service. For example, campaigns by groups like 
FinTech4Good promise/threaten to change the business improvement district (BID) and 
other ‘voluntary’ taxes and contributions made by communities.40 These taxpayers -- in 
theory and especially if paid with a native blockchain currency like Bitcoin -- could 
actually trace their coin to the final product or service via a blockchain.  
 










Budget Law PSD, arts 13, 14 PSD arts. 26-32 PSD arts. 70-73 
1. tying taxes to the 
specific tenders with 
unique IDs 
2. dist. ledger 
appropriations, transfers, 
and distributions 
3. portal showing whole-
of-government planned 
activities 
4. disbursement only if 
smart contract conditions 
met (like a team 
organized), 
5. automatic allocation of 
budget/man-hours to draft 
tenders, publish them, 
and so forth. 
7. appropriating for or 
crowding-in co-
investments from outside 
8. real-time audit of 
finance, asset and (if 
necessary) liability use. 
1. unique coin venture 
capital funding  




3. auto payment transfers 
between consortia 
members 
4. auto payment transfers 
between CAs calling for 
tenders  
5. electronic payment of 
contractors, staff and 
others (in tokens if 
accepted) 
6. FinTech and portal 
integration to allow 
querying 
7. auto querying b/t 
consortium members’ 
accounts to ensure 
solvency and liquidity. 















6. attestation of 
solvency/liquidity 
for competence 
7. specific funds 
tied to specific 
assets and/or 
outcomes in the 
project plan 
8. real-time audit  
9. bank/funder real-





partners and even  
public oversight of 
spending and 
results 
3. use of FinTech 
providers in case of  
liquidity shortfalls 
and other problems 
4. transfer of funds 





time haggling on 
price and terms - 
building vibrant 
markets. 
                                                 
37 As of 2021, Nicoletti represents an uncontested expert in the potential use of FinTech in public 
procurement. From understanding the procurement cycle to the ways flexible finance can help small and 
medium enterprises participate in tenders, Nicoletti provides a one-stop-shop for explaining many of the 
changes we can only describe here in passing. See Bernardo Nicoletti, Procurement Finance: The Digital 
Revolution in Commercial Banking, Palgrave, 2018.  
38 Oueid provides an excellent overview of the types of finance underpinning procurements (in her case, the 
procurement of microgrids). See Rima Oueid, Microgrid Finance, Revenue, and Regulation Considerations, 
The Electricity Journal 32(5), 2019, pp. 2-9, available online.  
39 For details, especially details related to the technical aspects of combining blockchains, smart contracts 
and procurement, see Freya Sheer Hardwick, Raja Naeem Akram, and Konstantinos Markantona, The Fair 
and Transparent Blockchain based Tendering Framework - A Step Towards Open Governance, Arxiv 
Working Paper 1805.05844, 2018, available online. 
40 See FinTech for Good, 2021, available at: http://www.fintechforgood.com/  
through automated bid 
and project coordination  
time monitoring of 
funds’ use 
* PSD refers to the EU Public Sector Directive 2014/24  
 
Distributed ledger technologies will not drive government budgeting any time soon. Yet, 
some scholars see a day where blockchains might serve as the medium on which budget 
debates, proposals, amendments, adoptions and even in-year tracking of appropriations 
versus spending can all take place.41 Some scholars have already mapped out how such 
new budget processes could align with new blockchain-centred procurement methods.42   
 
To take another example from Figure 1, FinTech offers to facilitate financial transactions 
within and between bidding consortia and other members. In the past, traditional supply 
professionals had to use cumbersome techniques -- like creating special purpose entities 
and joint venture legal structures.43 With blockchains, bidders can post transactions and 
instructions contingent on such finance, as well as can create communities which simply 
net out transactions between themselves or with non-group members. Such groupings can 
take the form of decentralized autonomous organizations (discussed later) or 
permissioned blockchains.44 
 
FinTech-enabled procurement promises to reduce transactions costs in several ways. First, 
because finance usually ‘travels’ the opposite direction as the real-world flows of goods 
and services such finance pays for, such blockchains can hold both the financial and 
logistics information of any transaction.45 Second, smart contracts can calculate the most 
economically advantageous offer using formulae provided to bidders and which 
contracting authorities must use anyway.46 To the extent contracting authorities use 
lifetime or other costing, public blockchain records of these costs in other awards would 
help set a baseline for determining such awards in the future.47 Third, ownership or 
possession can be tokenized - allowing for the easy and secure holding or transfer of 
these tokenized assets, liabilities, incomes, or expenses across the wide range of 
procurement stakeholders.48  
                                                 
41 For example, see Kai Schmidt and Philipp Sandner, Solving Challenges in Developing Countries with 
Blockchain Technology, Frankfurt School Blockchain Center Working Paper, 2017, at p. 9, available 
online.  
42 Ironically, some of the best laid plans come from the countries least able to carry them out. See Temofe 
Akaba, Alex Norta, Chibuzor Udokwu and Dirk Draheim, A Framework for the Adoption of Blockchain-
Based e-Procurement Systems in the Public Sector: A Case Study of Nigeria, In Marie Hattingh, Machdel 
Matthee, Hanlie Smuts, Ilias Pappas, Yogesh Dwivedi, and Matti Mantymaki, Responsible Design, 
Implementation and Use of Information and Communication Technology, 2020, available online.  
43 Adrian Smith, Consortium and Joint Venture Bidding, In Estimating, Tendering and Bidding for 
Construction, Springer, 1995, at 212-226, available online. 
44 Deshpande and co-authors describe the underlying technologies needed for such an organization. See J. 
Deshpande, M. Gowda, M. Dixit, M. Khubbar, B. Jayasri and S. Lokesh, Permissioned Blockchain Based 
Public Procurement Systems, Journal of Physics Conference Series 1706, 2020, available online.  
45 Colman McMahon, The Blockchain & Public Procurement: Reducing Corruption and Increasing 
Efficiency, 2016, available online. 
46 Public Sector Directive at art 35(6), art. 56.1 para 2, and especially the whole of art. 67 (award of 
contract). See Public Sector Directive 2014/24, hereinafter ‘PSD’. 
47 PSD at art. 68.  
48 For a fuller description, see Aryo Dhaneswara, Tokenizing Public Procurement, 2020, available online.  
 
Certain types and aspects of procurement seem more amenable to FinTech-enabled 
public procurement than others. Framework agreements, dynamic purchasing systems, 
electronic auctions and catalogues have the kind of repeat purchasing involving several 
pre-qualified parties -- and are thus amenable to FinTech-enabled procurement.49 The 
division of large procurements into lots also encourages the kinds of linked records which 
FinTech technologies encourage.50 Even documents required for first stage qualification -
- like the European Single Procurement Document -- have amend-only characteristics 
(like previous jobs) which seem amenable to recording on blockchains.51 Smart contract 
technologies can automatically screen tenders for compliance with award criteria, flag 
abnormally low tenders and even ensure compliance with various rules (such as criteria 
for the award of social and similar services).52  
 
FinTech will likely have the largest impact on non-standard public contracts. These 
include utility, concessions, state aid, block grant, and other contracts where winning 
bidders receive an ‘advantage.’53 As shown by the red-coloured actors in Figure 2, 
blockchains can keep tabs on these recipients of implicit or explicit subsidies - ensuring 
they do not excessively abuse the market power which their advantage confers to them.. 
While the Transport Regulation describes public networks in public passenger transport 
services, these economics apply to any public network.54 If the public procurement 
process handles any public service auctioned and resulting in a public service contract (or 
similar agreement), a public record on something like a public blockchain should contain 
non-commercially and non private elements of that award.55  
 
                                                 
49 Specifically the procedures defined in PSD arts. 33-36.  
50 The use of lots - particularly to encourage participation by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) -- 
represents a topic which we address later in this paper. See PSD at art. 46.  
51 See PSD at art. 59 (and section 3 in general for choice of vendors). The introduction of electronic 
procedures took more than 6 years to accomplish among EU member states. Whether these governments 
have the appetite to undergo another round of reform remains to be seen. See Judit Glavanits, The Future of 
Public Procurement: Innovation and Blockchain Technology, In Judit Glavantis and Peter Balint Kiraly 
(Eds), Law 4.0 – Challenges of the Digital Age, Szechenyi Istvan University, 2019, available online.  
52 See PSD at arts. 67, 69, and 74.  
53 The Utilities Directive, Transport Regulation as well as the various rules on state aid describe such 
advantage in greater detail. For the definition of advantage, and the other legal aspects of such advantage, 
see Phedon Nicolaides, State Aid, Advantage and Competitive Selection, European State Aid Law 
Quarterly 9(1), 65-78, 2010, available online. 
54 See Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by road, available 
online. 
55 Such a situation seems a long way away - as releasing/publicizing even paper public service contracts 
requires much effort in the UK. See Joshua Pritchard and Rose Lasko-Skinner, Please Procure Responsibly 
The State of Public Service Commissioning, Reform Procurement Working Paper, 2019, available online. 
 
 
FinTech will likely affect those areas of public procurement which benefit most from 
public-private partnerships of any kind. Figure 3 shows the ways FinTech might require 
changes to the standard procurement procedures dealing with such partnerships. For 
example, the UK’s Private Finance Initiative encouraged the private funding of projects 
ultimately going out in/under public tender.56  
 
Figure 3: FinTech Likely to Affect the Public-Private Nexus in Public Procurement  
 
public-private partnerships joint-ownership models cross-border 
procurement 
1. involving public in budgeting 
decision 
2. encourage special district taxes 
to pay for specific public goods 
3. transfer of government money to 
public to incentive certain 
behaviours 
4. payments to government on 
smart contract terms 
5. encourage postal banking and 
small scale financial inclusion 
(savings) 
6. specialized FinTech savings, 
investment or transfer (like 
agricultural banks of old days), 
7. real-time monitoring of 
spending, revenue (if applicable), 
responsible persons. 
8. smart purchases contingent on 
other partners’ performance on 
commitments 
9. smart contingent contracts in 
case of unforeseen events  
1. allows public to ‘own’ (outright 
or have mentionable rights in public 
goods/services) 
2.  help raise money for build-
operate-transfer to communities 
3.  raise money for upkeep if 
government unable/ unwilling 
4. securitization of public assets or 
even use-rights 
5. direct and easy bank monitoring 
6. direct savings to particular 
(exact) outputs 
7. e-transfers and public/visible 
proof  
1. Helps identify and 
facilitates valuation of assets  
(procurements) abroad 
2. International budgetary 
transfers (govt-to-govt)  
with or without using the 
banking system 
3. facilitates timely payments 
between foreign (and  
local) governments and 
companies 
4. facilitates timely and 
accurate payments between 
companies across borders  
5. provides basis for payment 
methods bypassing  
traditional currencies 
6. encourages inter-bank 
transfers, the verification of 
standing, and competence 
7. encourages oversight of 
procurements done abroad  
and foreigners foreign 
                                                 
56 See Akintola Akintoye, Cliff Hardcastle, Matthias Beck, Ezekiel Chinyio & Darinka Asenova, Achieving 
Best Value in Private Finance Initiative Project Procurement, Construction Management and Economics 
21(5), 2003, at 461-470, 2003, available online. 
10. real-time audit of results procurers at home 
 
Most importantly, FinTech-enabled public procurement should disintermediate finance 
and procurement, as separate functions.57 Traditional lenders must underwrite bidders’ 
bids, provide working capital (as part of winners’ cash management), provide deposits 
and other guarantees, as well as other funds in case of problems. For Nicoletti, such 
disintermediation between his 4 Ps -- proprietors, providers, producers, and purchasers— 
means that from conception, owners and producers can extend credit personally…without 
relying on these formerly third-party funders. Instead, procurement moves to electronic 
platforms or ecosystems.58   
 
FinTech-enabled procurement also promises to make procurement policy oversight 
easier. Public blockchains make data available to procurement agencies and officials (as 
well as financial regulators and the public). These groups can observe trade settlement, 
loan and finance flows, insurance terms, frequencies, and pay-outs as well as 
custodial/ownership chains and ‘transactions costs’ (like port fees, charges for 
consignments, tolls and other costs) to the extent privacy rules allow.59    
 
Is FinTech-enabled public procurement legal? In the EU’s Public Sector Directive for 
example, art 2(18) clearly applies to material on blockchains as ‘written’ and article 2(19) 
allows for such “electronic means”. Such law clearly allows for e-procurement, as EU 
policymakers put in place multi-year programmes to digitize various aspects of 
procurement, from e-certis to e-invoicing. Yet, challenges remain. Doubts and legal 
problems with using FinTech in public procurement abound.60 Technically, the Directives 
do not mention FinTech as a form of demonstrating “economic and financial standing,” 
thus leaving many applications in a state of uncertainty.61 The recent United Kingdom 
(UK) Green Paper tells just how FinTech can help share bidder information, ensure 
                                                 
57 Nicoletti provides the motivation for much of this section - and for much thinking about FinTech in 
public procurement. See Bernardo Nicoletti, Fintech and Procurement Finance 4.0, In B. Nicoletti, 
Procurement Finance, Springer, 2018, available online.     
58 For example, see Edward Frazelle, Supply Chain Strategy: Unleash the Power of Business Integration to 
Maximize Financial, Service, and Operations Performance, McGraw-Hill, 2018. No one argues for a 
revolutionary view more than Nicoletti. See Bernardo Nicoletti, The Future: Procurement 4.0, In Bernardo 
Nicoletti, Agile Procurement: Designing and Implementing a Digital Transformation, Springer, 
2017,available online. 
59 McMahon stresses that financial regulators would also have access to such information. Other authors 
like Sanchez-Graells, though, see such real-time market oversight as a white elephant. He claims - with 
convincing evidence - that blockchains and the other technologies enabling the use of FinTech would do 
little to allow regulatory authorities to engage in market oversight. See Colman McMahon, Blockchain & 
Public Procurement: Reducing Corruption, Increasing Efficiency, 2016, available online. See also Albert 
Sanchez-Graells, Data-Driven and Digital Procurement Governance: Revisiting Two Well-Known 
Elephant Tales, SSRN Working Paper, 2019, available online. 
60 For details, see Pawel Nowicki, Deus Ex Machina?: Some Remarks on Public Procurement in the Second 
Machine Age, European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 15, 53, 2020, available 
online. 
61 The PSD for example, sets out the acceptable means of showing such standing. All three criteria refer to 
statements generated from traditional banking intermediaries. See PSD, at Annex XII.  
bidders’ qualification, financial capacity, and so forth. But the Paper does not mention 
FinTech.62 
 
The Promises and Pitfalls of FinTech in Public Procurement 
 
FinTech can help make procurement cheaper, faster, and better serve the public interest. 
FinTech lowers the cost of procurement-related finance by disciplining or eliminating 
financial intermediaries in the procurement process. Especially in under-developed 
economies, eliminating financial intermediaries -- rather than trying to develop them first 
-- may lead to cheaper tenders.63 Avoiding such financial intermediaries may save 
bidders up to 10% or more on the cost of their capital via inefficient national financial 
services firms.64 For example, if a community wants a bridge, the bridge users themselves 
could pledge the electronic funds to the government entity or even particular bidders.65 
Clearly, such direct payments would be cheaper than the ‘procurement’ of microfinance 
providers -- in which financial institutions compete over the right to offer microloans to 
start-ups.66 Similarly, just-in-time funding could disburse funding based on smart contract 
rules -- reducing the need for reserve funding. Using cryptographic media of exchange 
and digital, cryptographically-secured securitized assets could certainly help reduce the 
need for such intermediaries’ services, ranging from custodianship (of assets) to simple 
funds transfers.  
 
FinTech-enabled technologies could lead - in the longer term -- toward a common 
procurement platform. On such a platform, bidders could seek crowdfunded short-term 
payables, trade finance, or even cross-border deposits or cross exchange rate funded 
ancillary services which could help reduce costs for cross border procurement. Such a 
common platform could also/even encourage third-party oversight - ensuring delivery on-
time and on-budget.67 Having an intermediary -- whether championed by the private or 
public sector - could help ensure an efficient procurement ecosystem.68 
  
                                                 
62 See UK Cabinet Office, Transforming Public Procurement, 2020, available online.  
63 In the 2010s, World Bank officials had heavily pushed for ‘financial sector development’ as an engine of 
growth. Later, they realized that too much development led to financial instability - rather than better 
governance or economic performance. See Adolfo Barajas, Thorsten Beck, Era Dabla-Norris, and Reza 
Yousefi, Too Cold, Too Hot, or Just Right?  Assessing Financial Sector Development Across the Globe, 
International Monetary Fund Working Paper 13/81, 2013, available online. 
64 See Pietro Calice and Nan Zhou, Benchmarking Costs of Financial Intermediation around the World, 
World Bank, available online. 
65 For a discussion, see Katrin Tinn, Distributed Ledger Technologies and Start-Up Financing, In Antonio 
Fatas (Ed.), The Economics of Fintech and Digital Currencies, p. 15, 2019, available online. 
66 See Unnamed author, Fund of Funds, FMFIB Launched a Public Procurement Procedure for Selection of 
Financial Intermediaries for Granting Microloans in the Social and Employment Fields, 2017, available 
online. 
67 In the US SmartProcure represents a procurement intelligence platform which provides historical 
purchasing data which procuring officials and others can use to lower costs and procure better quality 
goods and services. See GovTech: The Power to Transform Public Services in the UK, PWC Working 
Paper, 2016, at p. 9, available online.  
68 Jakob Edler and Jillian Yeow, Connecting Demand and Supply: The Role of Intermediation in Public 
Procurement of Innovation, Research Policy 45(2), 2016, pp 414-426, available online. 
FinTech-enabled procurement would reduce simple document and processing costs. 
Public procurement, at present, represents a costly and error-prone endeavour.69 The 
extension of e-procurement, to standardized smart contracts and documents widely 
visible by a number of parties, can help reduce errors in offers (such as those mistyped or 
indicating incorrect amounts). Such visibility can also speed up payment processing, 
reduce processing errors. FinTech technologies can also better handle the large-scale, 
ever-changing structures of consortia, their suppliers, and their related parties (as shown 
in Figure 2 earlier).70 Even in World Bank procurements, having 4 different oversight 
bodies has failed to stop poor procurement practices.71 Procurement-related FinTech 
applications could built-in automated checks during project procurement and better e-
auction facilities.72 Smart contracts can also better keep track of the ancillary aspects of a 
bid -- such as energy or environmental laws governing the way the winning bidder(s) 
structure and execute their project. Large works contracts or utilities often need to 
comply with thousands of regulations -- from national environmental laws to local set-
back rules for building fences.  
 
In line with EU and other countries’ procurement policy objectives, FinTech-enabled 
procurement could increase SMEs’ participation in public tendering. EU public 
procurement policy - and thus law - has long promoted SMEs’ participation in the EU 
procurement ecosystem. Yet, numerous studies show the difficulties these SMEs have 
had.73 SMEs can not compete because of a lack of access to finance (among other 
reasons).74 Many studies thus find that alternative methods of finance would make SMEs 
potentially more competitive.75 Whether as a decentralized or centralized system, various 
                                                 
69 Literally thousands of articles describe poor public procurement practice in almost any country. Even the 
reader uninitiated in smart contracts can not help see that automating much of the procurement process 
would eliminate much of the woe described by these authors. See Laura Carpineti, Gustavo Piga, and 
Matteo Zanza, The Variety of Procurement Practice: Evidence from Public Procurement, In Nicola Dimitri, 
Gustavo Piga and Giancarlo Spagnolo, Handbook of Procurement, Cambridge, 2006, available online. 
70 Yet, procurement authorities would need to rely on the same inefficient procuring officials to move 
toward FinTech-enabled procurement, making the transition so much harder. For this warning, see Darya 
Davtyan-Davydova, Marat Martirosyan, Alexander Bortenev and Olga Sergacheva, Implementation and 
Realization of Technologies to Distributed Registers (Blockchain) and Smart-Contracts in Public Purchases, 
In Competitive Russia: Foresight Model of Economic and Legal Development in the Digital Age, available 
online. See also Sergi Sanchez, The Implementation of Decentralised Ledger Technologies for Public 
Procurement: Blockchain Based Smart Public Contract, European Procurement and Public Private 
Partnership Law Review 14, 2019, p. 180,, available online. 
71 These four agencies include World Bank staff, the country office, the procurement agency and the entity 
managing the project. See IEG, The World Bank and Public Procurement—An Independent Evaluation  
Volume II: Achieving Development Effectiveness through Procurement in Bank Financial Assistance, 
2014, available online. 
72 Srinivas Yanamandra, Leveraging Fintech to Enhance Integrity in Public Finance, OECD On The Level, 
2019, available online. 
73 Anthony Flynn and Paul Davis, The Rhetoric and Reality of SME-Friendly Procurement, Public Money 
and Management 35(2), 2015, available online.  See also Anthony Flynn, Investigating the Implementation 
of SME-Friendly Policy in Public Procurement, Policy Studies 39(4), pp. 422-443, 2018, available online.   
74 For evidence, see Alessandro Ancarani, Carmela Di Mauro, Tara Hartley and Tunde Tátrai, A 
Comparative Analysis of SME Friendly Public Procurement: Results from Canada, Hungary and Italy, 
International Journal of Public Administration 42(13), pp. 1106-1121, 2019, available online.  
75 Le-rong Lu, Promoting SME Finance in the Context of the Fintech Revolution: A Case Study of the UK's 
Practice and Regulation, Banking and Finance Law Review 33(3), pp. 317-343, 2018, available online. 
alternative financing forms under the Fintech rubrique (like crowdfunding) could offer 
SMEs a way to compete for tenders with larger bidders.76 Some evidence already exists 
suggesting that FinTechs in China may make SME finance easier to obtain.77 Especially 
in international trade, FinTech could help SMEs obtain finance without costly third-party 
finance.78 
  
Fighting corruption represents one of the main motivations and areas where FinTech 
pilots have received the most attention. Some examples include the Brazilian National 
Development Bank’s loan for tokenization to “facilitate anti-corruption initiatives in 
project lending”, the Shenzhen Provincial Government’s blockchainisation of tax 
invoices (to prevent fraudulent reimbursements), and a supposedly tamper-proof land 
registry in Andhra Pradesh.79 The World Economic Forum has made much ado about a 
study about a project aiming to track school lunches in Medellin (Colombia).80 FinTech 
also facilitates anti-corruption investigations -- as artificial intelligence can sift through 
big data, applying advanced analytics, and machine learning algorithms to find fraud, 
corruption and other forms of malfeasance. Cronyism and the abuse of dominant 
positions held by large-integrated financial-industrial groups become harder with more 
transparent tendering and contract performance.81 When bidders -- or anyone -- can 
become their own bank, the potential for gain as well as for the tracking of fraud and the 
misappropriation of funds increases.82 
 
Such facilities would ease the recording and transfer/trade of government assets (many 
countries still do not have asset registers, much less any estimate of the value of those 
assets).83 Digital tokens and electronic commitment/disbursement records held in real 
time also facilitate project monitoring. Tokenised lending, distributed ledgers (like 
Hyperledger Fabric), and mobile applications thus give parties to procurement contracts -
- as well as citizens and other concerned third parties -- greater access to information. 
Even parties far away from the relevant municipality or administrative region can obtain 
this information.  
 
                                                 
76 For examples, see Mark Fenwick and Joseph McCahery, Fintech and the Financing of Entrepreneurs: 
From Crowdfunding to Marketplace Lending, European Corporate Governance Institute Law Working 
Paper No. 369/2017, 2017, available online. 
77 Tian-xiang Sheng, The Effect of Fintech on Banks’ Credit Provision to SMEs: Evidence from China 
Finance Research Letters, 2021, available online. 
78 Xiao-yu Wang and Fa-sheng Xu, A Theory of FinTech and Trade Finance, SSRN Working Paper 
3777250, 2021,  available online.  
79 For all these examples, see Srinivas Yanamandra, Leveraging Fintech to Enhance Integrity in Public 
Finance, OECD On The Level, 2019, available online. 
80 Ashley Lannquist and Rachel Raycraft, Exploring Blockchain Technology for Government Transparency: 
Blockchain-Based Public Procurement to Reduce Corruption, World Economic Forum Working Paper, 
2020, available online.  
81 Jeremy Kidd, FinTech: Antidote to Rent-Seeking, Chicago-Kent Law Review 93, 2018, p. 165, available 
online.  
82 Michael Nwogugu, The Case Of Apple, Inc., and Fintech: Managerial Psychology, Corporate 
Governance and Business Processes. SSRN Working Paper, 2015, available online. 
83 See M. Grubisic, M. Nusinovic and G. Roje, Towards Efficient Public Sector Asset Management, 
Financial Theory and Practice 33(3), 2009, pp. 329-362, available online. 
FinTech-enabled public procurement promises to make procurement supply just as 
dynamically responsive to real-time market conditions as in private sector markets. 
Smart contracts can leave procurement terms flexible -- thus allowing for greater 
flexibility in price discovery (particularly around supply contracts) -- adjusting in real 
time to changing interest rates, exchange rates, prices, and other market terms, and using 
automatic funds transfers which select the cheapest method of transfer.84 After the 
contract award, FinTech-enabled project finance and lending could facilitate interest 
payments to vendors in real-time (adjusting frequently to complex swap and other terms), 
shifting repayment schedules, contingent payments, and so forth. Parties all along the 
supply chain could even extend to each other credit or ownership stakes (in immediately 
securitized and transferable digital tokens and others contracts). For vendor insurance 
(from contract performance insurance to insurance on materials used in providing a good, 
work or service), FinTech-enabled applications could help refine premium pricing, ensure 
timely premium payments, enable ‘dynamic’ pricing, and payment if triggering events 
occur.85 Dynamic ledgers could ensure the accurate recording of carbon credits, energy 
coupons, and other kinds of ‘chits’ aimed at introducing market-like mechanisms into 
traditionally non-market industries during procurements.86    
 
For all its purported benefits, one of the dangers of FinTech-enabled procurement stems 
from simply replacing one form of credit card or currency with another - and calling it 
FinTech. The Angeleno Card represents an example - whereby local Los Angeles 
residents obtained government services through the use of a card given out by the 
government, rather than by banks.87 Or as Forbes points out, one bank (Cross River) 
actually provides the funds that seem to come from a whole diverse FinTech ecosystem.88  
 
FinTech’s newness potentially will lead to systemic problems and potential fraud as a 
very real possibility. Arslanian and Fischer wrote an entire book on the potential 
problems involved in transferring over to, and using, a new financial ecosystem.89  
The early days of Wirecard show that fraud can occur by selling something as a miracle 
FinTech solution -- only to have the promoters skip town with investors’ money.90 I 
                                                 
84 For more, see John Ream, Yang Chu , David Schatsky, Upgrading Blockchains, Deloitte Insights, 2016, 
available online.   
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86 For an even more optimistic vision, see Seong-Kyu Kim and Jun-Ho Huh, Blockchain of Carbon Trading 
for UN Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainability 12(10), 2020, available online. 
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Financial Services, Palgrave, 2019.  
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Bloomberg, 2020, available online. Authors like Zeranski and Sancak might argue that under-regulation -- 
rather than anything inherent in FinTech itself -- represents the cause of such fraud and potential corruption. 
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Working Paper 3666939, 2020, available online.  
promised earlier not to talk about security or technical standards. Yet, without a common 
standard and demonstrated reliable regulation, government assets may be too vulnerable 
to ‘digitize’ (at least the securitized and digital form of ownership rights to them).91  
 
Another of FinTech’s dangers lies in its ability to help governments further push public 
responsibilities off its balance sheets. Co-finance, crowd-finance, and the public 
holding of rights or assets in digital/crypto form -- if the past serves as any indication -- 
will just encourage governments to further renege on budgetary obligations.92 At the 
extreme, such actions aid in privatizing the state.93 Or at the opposite extreme, by giving 
contracting authorities significant power over both bidders and the very capitalist system 
they operate in.94 In theory, procurement policy should be indifferent to a country’s 
internal public-private sector organization. Yet, most of the discussion around FinTech in 
the public sector leans toward figuring out how to make citizens pay for public goods 
directly, rather than help governments and public entities provide them.95  
 
Why Should We Care About Procurement Principles?  
 
As government officials look to FinTech to modernize public procurement, they need to 
keep general procurement principles in mind. Throughout the procurement process, 
tendering rules will affect the terms of project finance - in effect tying the adoption of 
FinTech in public procurement to procurement law itself. Firms’ demonstrating financial 
capacity represents an obvious example.96 Financing costs in public service contracts 
represent another example where bidders may have latitude to make projects look 
cheaper ex-ante than they are ex-post.97 Procuring micro-finance services, the treasury 
services of a private bank, and/or using investment intermediaries to deal with public debt 
represent less certain examples of FinTech in the public space.98 The flexibility given to 
contracting authorities to change tenders according to bidders’ information and ideas (in 
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available online. 
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97 PSD, at art. 13(b).  
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certain cases) require flexibility in the way bidders fund those ideas. Thus, existing public 
procurement principles will affect the introduction and use of FinTech in such 
procurement. Several themes and trade-offs stand out, especially in the EU’s case law.  
 
Rules versus discretion. FinTech’s rule-based nature can come into conflict with current 
jurisprudence which allows for some purchasers’ discretion. The Directives make ample 
room for negotiation between contracting authorities and bidders (offering at least 3 
procedures making explicit reference to changes in procurement documents).99 EU case 
law, furthermore, has upheld contracting agency discretion (within limits) time after time. 
Examples include SIAC most importantly; and NATS Services v. Gatwick in the UK, 
which established some judicial deference toward contracting authorities and tender 
juries.100 Such rulings suggest that public buyers have a relatively large leeway in 
adopting FinTech technologies.  
 
The struggle between rules and discretion has produced two doctrines in particular which 
FinTech applications would have a hard time emulating. First, contracting agencies must 
code rules -- and bidders must code responses -- which interpret bidding requirements 
relative to a “reasonably well informed and diligent tenderer.”101 Artificial intelligence 
applications - by extrapolating rules from the successes and failures of other bidders and 
past bids -- might eventually arrive at such behaviour. But contracting agencies and 
courts would have some difficulty deciding just how much algorithmic training the 
FinTech application needs before approximating such a standard.102 Second, no algorithm 
could likely decide whether a bidder has a solidarity objective (versus capitalization 
objective) which exempts a body from liability under state aid rules.103 One could 
imagine, though, FinTech technologies encouraging courts to agree with more specific 
rules provided for in computer code.  
 
Disclosure versus effective remedy. Transparency represents a core value in most 
national procurement law.104 Many of FinTech’s advocates crow about the extra 
transparency blockchains and related FinTech technologies will bring to tenders. Yet, 
some aspects of FinTech -- particularly neural network and algorithmic-based learning 
and closed development standards -- serve as proverbial black boxes. In theory, agencies 
need not disclose all scores given to bidders -- as several cases have affirmed contracting 
authorities’ right to conceal sub-criteria.105 Smart contracts could (rightly or wrongly) 
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contain undisclosed rules by or for both buyer and seller. For example, one could easily 
imagine financing contract covenants contingent on the borrower’s performance of some 
activities - like buying insurance or maintaining a certain credit score.  
 
Such a lack of such disclosure though can conflict with the EU remedies regime. Bidders 
can not contest infringements they know nothing about. Most procurement regimes 
require adequate remedies for slighted bidders.106 Yet, the automated nature of some 
aspects of the FinTech-enabled procurements described above do not allow for breaches 
of contract (especially when the ‘code is the contract’).107 As such, FinTech applications 
can deny to economic operators the information or opportunity to file complaints. 
Bidders can not prove breaches of rules designed to increase transparency without such 
transparency in the first place. Even proving basic errors -- like “manifest breaches” (of 
tender scoring rules for example) -- could prove impossible. Worse, FinTech applications 
themselves may provide inferences needed to deduce undisclosed, confidential or secret 
information. With access to enough information about bidders’ and their bids, economic 
operators can basically “game” the system. Contracting authorities will thus need to 
resolve these dilemmas in their FinTech applications’ code. 
 
FinTech as public utility versus restricting competition in financial markets. EU 
procurement law stresses the immateriality of the internal organization of a country’s 
economic structure.108 Governments should finance public activities via the budget, or a 
public FinTech (bank), or regulated private FinTech solutions, as desired. If governments 
pay for certain goods and services, numerous cases encourage contracting authorities to 
seek the widest amount of participation by eligible bidders in public tenders.109 These 
authorities may thus seek to participate in FinTech schemes lower all these bidders’ cost 
of capital on an equal/proportionate basis. Some even see FinTech as a public utility -- 
particularly given its network economics - like public transport networks.110  
 
If the government supports FinTech-enabled public procurement applications, credits and 
financing from these applications might favour some firms over others. Such support 
could thus violate the non-discrimination and equal treatment principles enshrined in 
procurement law.111 Indeed, early analysis suggests that FinTechs could displace 
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traditional financial firms - definitely not a market neutral outcome.112 Even indirect 
support or block support to all firms could be discriminatory (at best) and/or distortionary 
(at worst). Imagine a bidder who ticks certain tender sub-criteria just to get access to 
cheaper credit. The government buyer’s mere bid design, which affects the cost of a 
bidder’s capital, could give responding firms an unfair commercial advantage. Such an 
advantage could easily fall afoul of state aid or competition law.   
 
The principles regarding financial regulation do not necessarily overlap with those of 
public procurement. Both laws cherish a level playing field between undertakings of any 
kind -- in bids as well as in market conduct.113 Most governments keep any 
‘brainstorming’ about procurement firmly within their financial supervisory bodies.114 
The current thinking on FinTech regulation involves trial-and error (in sandboxes) or best 
practice, overseen by financial authorities.115 Such financial regulators focus on financial 
systemic stability, innovation, costs and access -- among other principles.116 Yet, 
procurement’s focus on the public interest and solidarity have given procurement bodies -
- even those in central banks - license to procure FinTech services subject to both sets of 
law.117 Central bank procurement clearly falls under procurement law. These 
deliberations about FinTech should involve procurement policy officials.  
 
FinTech as Administrative Means Versus Policy End.  The literature tends to treat 
FinTech in two ways. First, FinTech provides a means for procuring better goods, 
services and works more cheaply. Such a view argues that FinTech -- like e-procurement 
rules - simply serves to better achieve already existing policies and principles. Second, 
FinTech represents part of a broader, national innovation policy. Clearly, a large number 
of governments treat the development FinTech as an objective in itself. Indeed, many 
governments have tried to procure FinTech as an innovation (as discussed in the next 
chapter).  
 
The view one takes determines the way officials regulate FinTech, and organize its 
regulators. Viewing FinTech like the next step of e-procurement puts FinTech policy in 
the hands of procurement policy and officials. Financial regulators regulate the use of 
FinTech applications and governmental agencies follow those rules like they might 
follow environmental or other standards. Viewing FinTech like innovation policy gives 
                                                 
112 See Rene Stulz, FinTech, BigTech, and the Future of Banks, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 
31(4), 86-97, 2019, available online.  
113 Competition law applies just as much to the economic operator in the performance of a public contract 
as it does to a financial body in the open market.  
114 For one example, see Charles Taylor, Christopher Wilson, Eija Holttinen, and Anastasia Morozova, 
Institutional Arrangements for FinTech Regulation and Supervision, IMF Fintech Note No. 19/02, 2019, 
available online. 
115 In particular, see Marlene Amstad, Regulating FinTech: Objectives, Principles, and Practices, Asian 
Development Bank Institute Working Paper 1016, 2019, available online. 
116 Id.  
117 The next section discusses the numerous central bank tenders with EU and international donor support. 
See Jorge García-Andrade and Phoebus Athanassio, National Central Banks and Community Public Sector 
Procurement Legislation: A Critical Overview, European Central Bank Legal Working Paper 3, 2006, 
available online.  
 
procurement officials a voice in the implementation of that policy. Such a view also 
provides centralized purchasing bodies, ancillary purchasing activities, and procurement 
services providers an important role to play in shaping the way procurement-related 
finance 118 As long as they stick to linking tender documents to the subject matter of 
the procurement, contracting authorities can help push FinTech in any way decided by 
the sitting government.   
 
Public procurement principles matter just as much to FinTech’s evolution as financial 
regulations. Nothing requires financial regulators - at the national or international level - 
to develop FinTech-enabled procurement services in a transparent way, favouring equal 
treatment (except as required by competition law), proportionality in regulation, and 
serving the public interest. The next section looks at some of those principles more 
specifically -- showing how the race to develop national FinTech ecosystems can lead to 
worse procurement outcomes -- at home and internationally.  
 
The Principles Involved in Procuring a FinTech System 
 
 The Costs and Benefits of Procuring a FinTech Ecosystem/Standards  
 
Many authors argue for direct government involvement in ‘procuring’ FinTech (or a 
national FinTech ecosystem). In their view, private sector financial services firms will 
under-invest in innovative procurement-related FinTech services -- leading to significant 
under-investment at the national level.119 Regulatory sandboxes (and especially 
procurement sandboxes) represent one of the key ways governments encourage the 
private sector to develop such FinTech services.120  As these sandboxes expand, FinTech 
services -- and the needed regulation - expand at the same time.121 The poorly analysed 
initial data seem to already show that regulatory sandboxes lead to more FinTech 
growth.122 Such work encourages many governments to use procurement as a pro-active 
instrument in developing the very FinTech which would help make such procurements 
easier in the future.123 
 
Governments thus actively ‘procure FinTech’ -- awarding contracts to existing FinTech 
companies and organizations in the hopes of tripping on new technologies. For example, 
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the Bank of Lithuania launched in 2018 a tender to develop LB Chain (LB for Lietuvos 
Bankas or Bank of Lithuania in Lithuanian). Selecting three firms -- Deloitte in Ireland, 
IBM in Poland and Tieto in Lithuania -- the Bank of Lithuania required these firms to 
consult with local FinTech firms to develop and test a “blockchain based product” to the 
Bank’s specifications.124 At that project’s wrap up meeting, Bank staff foresaw the 
blockchain ‘project’ evolving into a LTChain, which would serve non-financial firms.  
 
Other initiatives -- funded by international organizations -- also show how authorities are 
trying to procure FinTech. The pilot blockchain project in Colombia represents one of the 
most apposite examples.125 The project aims to use the blockchain Ethereum with school 
meal providers in Medellin (Colombia) schools.126 The project received support from the 
Inter-American Development Bank -- among other organizations. Less directly focused 
on public procurement, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
has funded a Bank of Greece project to develop FinTech products as part of a regulatory 
sandbox.127 The EBRD project represents one of the few FinTech projects sponsored by 
international organizations that actually went out to tender.128  
 
Projects like these illustrate the problems involved in governments actively trying to 
influence the development of FinTech -- whether for use in public procurements or not. 
In the case of Lithuania’s LB Chain, the project ended up moving away from blockchains 
and toward giving privileged access to information to privileged entities.129 The LB 
Chain received ‘pre-commercial’ support from the European Structural and Investment 
Funds and European Assistance for Innovation Procurement.130 Such pre-commercial 
support represents a kind of ‘procurement for procurement’ -- whereby the contracting 
agency finds out what to procure by procuring R&D which develops future 
procurements.131  
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The international organizations’ work on FinTech risks distorting FinTech development. 
Almost every international organization has some kind of FinTech unit or department. 
They manage hundreds of projects and person-hours every year in FinTech-related work. 
Some -- like the IADB -- even fund FinTech start-ups. Much of this work does not go out 
to tender. The self-managed nature of such a vast research programme across the 
international organizations takes hundreds of millions of dollars out of a potentially open 
international tender market. Few of these resources are directed under competitive 
bidding.132 Moreover, such work, done in collaboration with third-party organizations 
with connections to these organizations tacitly encourages the development of these 
burgeoning FinTech application providers over others -- especially those that might 
develop later.133 Foregoing future (and potentially better) FinTech solutions may 
represent one of the largest costs of the current push to procure FinTech.134  
 
National governments’ reliance on certain procurement procedures, which basically allow 
them to hand-pick partners, risks distorting FinTech’s development. Procurement 
officials have long dealt with market research and innovation-based contracts.135 Such 
procedures lack much of the competitive nature that helps ensure value-for-money and 
best results. Yet, in cases where contracting organizations used some form of competitive 
bidding, project results have been lacklustre.136 As with other types of public financial 
support for innovation, procuring FinTech innovation so early in the technology’s 
development risks locking it into an inefficient development path.137 
 
Principles in Procuring a National FinTech-Based Procurement Financing System  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Procurement: A Demand or Supply Policy Instrument in Relation to Innovation? R&D Management 45(2), 
2015, available online.  
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To what extent does the public procurement of FinTech products and companies adhere 
to generally accepted procurement principles? Similiarly, to what extent does the use of 
FinTech applications like smart contracts or cryptoassets during the public procurement 
process conform with broader procurement jurisprudence? EU procurement law, for 
example, requires procedures which ensure transparency and equal treatment, while 
“taking into account sustainability criteria for social services.”138 Given finance’s role in 
determining bidders’ competitiveness, governments must ensure that companies 
generally have access to the same advantages (or that a particular company using an 
advantageous FinTech financier is not unreasonably advantaged).139 If the history of the 
digitization of procurement serves as any example, cheaper capital and looser 
procurement regulations may help encourage competition.140 Yet, the evidence from 
public-private partnership financing in the UK seems to show that the cost of capital is 
determined after the firm wins - and that such costs vary.141 As long as winning firms 
have access to the FinTech solution -- and as long as such finance takes the relative 
participation of government and the private sector into account, then such FinTech can 
benefit the whole market -- fairly.142  
 
Many obstacles lie on the road to the fair procurement of FinTech or using FinTech fairly 
in procurements. Incumbent firms frequently participating in tenders (and thus used to 
existing procurement policies) have a competitive advantage.143 The EU Parliament has 
even warned about the potential for government policy to violate equal treatment and 
non-discrimination in encouraging FinTech through procurement and programmes like 
sandboxes and incubators.144 As such, a government-led development of FinTech for 
public procurement could distort the market more than help it. 
 
Some configurations of general ledgers (like blockchains), smart contracts and the 
tokenization of cryptoassets could violate the transparency principle as well. Blockchains 
are harder to ‘mine’ for data than other forms of data storage and managing public 
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permissioning may pose serious problems in FinTech’s early years.145 Particularly, public 
disclosures may leak confidential information or information which can/should remain 
public for only a limited period.146 Until blockchains can handle the automated 
provisioning of information, government purchasers will need to question how much - 
and what -- information can be put on blockchains.147     
 
To what extent can procurement agencies or contracting agencies require the use of a 
FinTech solution in their invitations to bid (and thus bidding documents and contracts)? 
When do such requirements become disproportional to their supposed aims?  The EU 
mandated that contracting authorities adopt e-procurement toward the end of the 2010s -- 
without legal challenge.148 If such requirements help cement the common market - and 
compete with China (as discussed at length later) - such mandates may improve 
procurement outcomes and ‘the European project.’149 Evidence from Greece reaffirms the 
experience across the EU that government agencies of all kinds have had difficulty 
accepting and implementing e-procurement activities.150 Even if EU and other courts 
accept FinTech measures as proportional to their procurement aims, nothing guarantees 
buy-in from budgeting entity heads.  
 
Is FinTech Procurement a Service of General Public Interest…Or State Aid?  
  
Could governments regulate FinTech services as utilities? Procurement policy might 
encourage FinTech’s development through, “special or exclusive rights granted by 
Member States concerning the supply to, provision or operation of networks for 
providing the services concerned” (i.e. FinTech)?151 For example, the World Bank has 
partly funded Ghanaian mobile operator AirtelTigo’s mobile money application.152 The 
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1911.05399, 2019, available online. 
148 Some member states even tried to exceed the Commission’s requirements. See Luís Soares and Adao 
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State, Institutions and Democracy, In Norman Schofield and Gonzalo Caballero (Eds), State, Institutions 
and Democracy, 363-388, 2016, available online. 
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application allows users to save money in order to buy subsidized toilets. The 
procurement of sanitation services and other utilities which will charge for their services 
thus give FinTechs a temporary economic advantage which they can use to provide 
services of a potentially general economic (or social) interest.  
 
The EU Public Procurement Directive explicitly gives member states the right to provide 
such services as they see fit.153 Could part of FinTech’s support for public procurement 
(or visa-versa, the procurement of FinTech) represent a “service of general public 
interest”?154 At first glance, FinTech certainly seems to represent such a “general 
economic interest.”155 FinTech - both as a sector and particular FinTech products - 
definitely benefit from the ‘network effects’ that scholars have come to know these 
services of general economic interest by.156 If projects like the aforementioned LT Chain 
succeed, government money might have helped displace, and potentially replace, parts of 
the Lithuanian economy.  
 
To what extent does the development of FinTech -- particularly for public procurement -- 
represent such ‘services of general economic interest’?157 First, these FinTechs would 
need to “discharge public service obligations and those obligations have been clearly 
defined.”158 A public procurement solution for a member state, or operating EU-wide, 
would seem to provide such a public service. The second condition though seems far 
harder to meet. Namely, “parameters on the basis of which the compensation is 
calculated have been established beforehand in an objective and transparent manner.”159 
FinTech’s uncertain technologies seem to make such a quantification and calculation 
impossible. The third and fourth planks of the Altmark test seem particularly problematic 
to prove -- as an alternative to a FinTech-based financing solution for public procurement 
already exists under competitive market conditions. Proving these third and fourth 
conditions similarly require a reasonably good cost-benefit analysis in order for 
governments to financially support FinTech networks’ development for use in public 
procurement.   
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What if such support consisted of developing common standards, rather than funding the 
build-out of such networks themselves? EU and other jurisdictions’ procurement law 
have actively encouraged the setting of common standards which allow for cost-reducing 
standardization in procurement processing and the operation of electronic networks.160   
Such standards -- especially if developed outside government -- could help foster the kind 
of innovation which might get FinTech-related procurement applications going.161 Yet, 
nothing guarantees that procurement officials can choose the best standards ex ante.162 At 
its worst, such support may fund particular FinTechs, which may distort markets and 
break state aid law in some jurisdictions.  
 
In the EU in particular, national government support for FinTech applications in public 
procurement may bump-up against state aid rules.163 Simply organizing tenders or 
auctions for FinTech companies may not protect contracting authorities from national 
competition law, procurement law or state aid rules. The EU has already considered the 
matter -- proposing measures aimed at countering the harmful effects of such aid 
(especially to financial services firms).164 Yet, nothing in EU procurement law absolves 
government entities of breaking procurement laws (or state aid law) by trying to remedy 
their effects ‘downstream’ -- even if such policies may promote consumer welfare after 
the fact.165 These mitigating policies may absolve contracting authorities of liability 
under competition law, but not procurement law.     
 
Simply transferring such aid from states to their taxpayers directly does not solve the 
legal problems mentioned above. As mentioned previously, FinTech apps may allow 
public service users to directly pay for these services -- rather than pay into a government 
treasury account for them. FinTech applications might allow would-be taxpayers to pay 
for services which would otherwise consist of illegal state aid. Such a ‘privatization’ may 
also encourage the development of anti-competitive FinTech services and the provision 
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of permanent ‘direct awards’ by sidestepping government and its rules altogether. In most 
jurisdictions, water represents a public utility whose purchases fall under some kind of 
procurement policy. Yet, FinTech might provide a way to fund “off-grid” utility 
provision - in effect privatizing these hitherto public utilities.166 FinTech applications can 
also help target remittances toward paying a specific household’s water bills and tracking 
subsidies with blockchains to ensure that subsidized users obtain the intended benefits.167  
 
Support for FinTech-enabled public procurement applications thus needs to adhere to a 
number of conditions. First, such support would thus need to ensure an open 
architecture which gives no entity - including currently existing FinTech undertakings -- 
an illegal or dubious advantage. The EU’s FinTech Action Plan focuses on ensuring 
“technology-neutral” and “innovation promoting” policy.168 Yet, by ignoring 
procurement policy - while simultaneously continuing to work with central banks and 
international organisations on pilot FinTecch programmes -- such a policy does not even 
pretend to aspire toward technological neutrality. 
 
 Second, procurement law itself provides for a wide margin of negotiation and 
exemptions from such law.169 FinTech technologies even allow for entity-specific 
regulation, conducted via smart contracts. While “entity based” regulation and block 
exemptions may sound good in theory - governments should ensure an open debate and 
the transparent allotment of any such advantages.170 If government provides subsidies or 
subsidized services, they can use blockchain technology itself to track the way market 
participants transfer such advantages across the economy. The same FinTech tools which 
can help governments distort markets can also help them keep track of these distortions. 
 
Putting FinTech into Procurement Law: Preventing a Free-For-All  
 
Can Contracting Authorities Let a Thousand FinTech Flowers Bloom? 
 
Why not let individual contracting authorities decide how to incorporate FinTech into 
their public procurement plans?171 The case law (at least in the EU) tends to allow 
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contracting authorities wide discretion -- as long as they define FinTech-related issues 
clearly in their invitations to tender (or tendering documents). These authorities could 
stipulate how FinTech-using bidders should arrange financing or payment terms within 
their consortia or with the contracting authority itself. During the award, contracts could 
further specify how these FinTech-using contracting parties deal with these financing 
terms. Such contracts could treat all the parties to a contract as a loosely organized entity 
-- with contractual relations between all parties handled with Fintech-related 
technologies.172  
 
In theory, FinTech-related technologies allow tenders and awards to be organized as 
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). Such DAOs allow for automation 
of contractual relations between the wide range of bidding and procuring entities party to 
a tender.173 More importantly, for some kinds of blockchains, parties can vote on 
particular aspects of bids or contracts, or change them according to fixed rules. Such 
voting would make these virtual procurement organizations ‘dynamically democratic.’174 
Such DAOs will undoubtedly disrupt information-handling services like those found in 
public procurement.175 
 
In practice, such DAOs have a long way to go before contracting authorities can use them 
as advertised. DAOs, as represented by Slock.it and others, represent poor, incomplete, 
unenforceable contracts.176 The inevitable complexities of modern business make 
complete DAOs (those without any break-points for pre-programmed human intervention) 
impossible.177 Yet, limited forms may automate and simplify (from the human users’ 
point of view) procurement.  
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The public-private partnership (PPP) looks particularly apt for FinTech.178 These long-
lived projects involve large numbers of partner organizations, whose information and 
payments literally straddle the public-private divide.179 Governments often take equity 
stakes in these partnerships (an area ripe for crypto-securitization).180  Such public-
private project finance of particular types of public spending -- particularly infrastructure 
projects -- could result in better project performance.181 Naturally, not all projects will 
benefit from PPP structures, or FinTech.182 FinTech - in PPPs as in other modes of public 
procurement -- can easily serve to distract managers and accountants in cases where no 
case for FinTech financing exists.183  
 
The lack of a link to the subject matter may dissuade some contracting authorities from 
aggressively developing and using FinTech applications. EU case law -- for example -- 
allows for public buyers to pursue public policies -- like innovation and thus FinTech - to 
the extent they have a link to a contract’s main purpose.184 For example, disproportionate 
requirements forcing bidders to use certain types of renewable energy in the past have run 
into legal problems on such grounds.185 Contracting authorities might have a hard time 
convincing bidders and judicial bodies that FinTech requirements in invitations to tender 
and contracts represent proportionate, non-discriminatory and transparent policies. 
Letting government buyers -- even those like state-owned enterprises -- go outside the 
standard government finance rules to select (or mandate) their own financing terms 
invites corruption and self-serving.  
 
                                                 
178 Readers unfamiliar with the financing structures around these projects should see Joaquim Miranda and 
Luc Renneboog, Anatomy of public-private partnerships: their creation, financing and renegotiation, 
International Journal of Managing Projects in Business 9(1), 2016, available online. 
179 The next section describes the geopolitical implications of these partnerships. For a description of the 
way Chinese officials have already started thinking about using them, see Nir Kshetri, China's Emergence 
as the Global Fintech Capital and Implications for Southeast Asia, Asia Policy 15(1), 61-81, 2020, available 
online. 
180 The use of crypto-assets in infrastructure or other PPPs remains highly speculative -- even in China (one 
of the global leaders in FinTech). For a discussion, see Po-shan Yu, Zuo-zhang Chen and Jin Sun,  
Innovative Financing: An Empirical Study on Public–Private Partnership Securitisation in China, 
Australian Economic Papers 57(3), 394-425, 2018, available online.   
181 At least, as of 2014. See Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fisher, and Alexander Galetovic, Finance and Public-
Private Partnerships, Stanford Centre for International Development Working Paper No. 496, 2014, 
available online. 
182 Indeed, private finance from any source can sometimes encourage adverse incentives. See Stephen 
Glaister, Past Abuses and Future Uses of Private Finance and Public Private Partnerships in Transport, 
Public Money & Management 19(3), 29-36, 1999, available online. 
183 IFRS Rule 9 in particular on trade finance comes to mind. The marking of expected credit losses could 
require extensive algorithms and even inaccessible (from the reporting entity’s point of view) data. Authors 
have worried about this since McQuaid and Scherrer (if not before). See Ronald McQuaid and Walter 
Scherrer, Changing Reasons for Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs), Public Money & Management 30(1), 
2010, available online. 
184 The link to the subject matter test remains a core part of EU procurement law. The test comes up in the 
literature most under discussions of green tech procurement. See Marc Martens and Stanislas de Margerie, 
The Link to the Subject-Matter of the Contract in Green and Social Procurement, European Procurement & 
Public Private Partnership Law Review 8(1), 8-18, 2013, available online.  
185 Mariana Mazzucato and Gregor Semieniuk, Financing Renewable Energy: Who is Financing What and 
Why It Matters, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 127, 2018, p. 8-22 
Many argue that regulatory permissiveness (allowing parties to use FinTech as they see 
fit) represents the way to develop harder, black letter law on the subject. As thousands of 
contracting authorities write FinTech-based requirements into their procurement 
documents, both bidders and courts will have a chance to incorporate best practices into 
black letter law.186 By letting a thousand flowers bloom - figuratively speaking -- 
procurement law can adapt to the benefits (and costs) that FinTech will impose on 
procuring bodies.  
 
More likely, unfettered contracting authority discretion to develop and use FinTech apps 
might lead to an inefficient free-for-all. The inconsistent application of rules meant to 
help certain parties - like SMEs -- may end up serving the political or other interests of 
contracting authorities.187 Scholars and government officials have sought (for decades) 
ways of decreasing harmful competition between contracting authorities through 
centralized and/or aggregated purchasing.188 Left to their own devices, contracting 
authorities might engage in bidding wars and other unsocial behaviour.189 Econometric 
studies also show that placing restrictions on procuring agents can lead to better 
coordinated procurement - and thus procurement outcomes.190 If contracting authorities’  
discretion and differences across countries have served them - or their taxpaying 




From SupTech/RegTech toward a Centralized Procurement Law 
 
Could supervisory technologies (SupTech) and/or regulatory technologies (RegTech) 
overcome the myriad of dangers that decentralized FinTech-enabled public procurement 
could cause? In theory, if contracting authorities can develop different FinTech solutions, 
then they can use the same technologies to regulate and supervise FinTech’s use. Namely, 
blockchains, smart contracts, distributed ledger technology, and tokenization can help 
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regulate and police procurement across the whole of government.192 Take a road works 
procurement as an example. The public sector buyer can use FinTech applications related 
to the financing of materials, distributing payments to contractors, transferring ownership 
with cryptographic tokens digitally, and provide real-time access to some project 
information to the public.193  
 
Contracting authorities could adopt SupTech or RegTech apps just as easily as adopting 
FinTech applications. Over 66% of new RegTech providers target public sector 
organizations -- suggesting some kind of demand from government bodies.194 If DAOs 
can create self-contained procurements (with all the rules, including those on supply 
finance), then they can also contain all the rules (i.e. regulation) necessary for automated 
supervision.195 Yet, no obvious case suggests that a Ministry of Health (for example) 
might need different procurement regulations or supervision than a Ministry of 
Education.196   
 
Even if contracting authorities adopt both FinTech applications and Reg/SupTech 
applications, they will require some common services. If Hong Kong’s experience with 
e-procurement serves as a guide, then any regulatory approach should focus on adequate 
financial support (for the incorporation of FinTech in procurement in a sensible way), the 
interoperability of standards with traditional communication systems, and adequate 
security.197 Top management’s understanding and support for such FinTech and RegTech 
adoption will also prove important (as well understanding the winning bidders’ financial 
and other interests in the contract/award).198 If anything, weaker authorities might likely 
resist - rather than wholeheartedly embrace - FinTech-centred reform.199   
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The potential for corruption and self-serving during the FinTech transition makes some 
central authority important. Even regulatory and supervision applications developed 
with the best of intentions could lead to poor social or other outcomes.200 Many procuring 
bodies in more corrupt jurisdictions would likely find ways of avoiding certain parts of 
smart contract applications which supervise their work (or just avoid supervisory tech all 
together).201 Without relatively honest civil servants and/or bidder businessmen, no 
amount of FinTech (or FinTech regulation) can help improve procurement’s efficiency or 
value.202 RegTech applications could ironically shield government entities and bidders 
from oversight -- giving them the de facto power to self regulate using black-box 
applications that deter outside oversight.203 
 
Could a central authority have the competence to oversee how government bodies use 
FinTech? Doesn’t FinTech regulation fall strictly to financial regulators? Indeed, if past 
experience serves as a guide - the forced adoption of FinTech rules, as well as any 
regulatory or supervisory rules overseeing them -- can lower the cost of capital.204 In the 
EU, cases like EasyPay and Finance Engineering show just how seemingly ancillary 
activities like procurement finance fall under procurement law’s remit.205 Given the 
wider ranging impacts of FinTech, traditional financial regulators will definitely 
need to cede some of their competencies to other bodies -- public and private.
206 
 
The need for centralized regulation will depend on each country’s legal and business 
traditions. Some countries - like those with common law traditions - will naturally find 
contracting, information sharing and even the specification of digital assets easier in a 
FinTech-enabled procurement regime.207  
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Contours of FinTech-Enabled Procurement Law 
 
In theory, procurement law already gives contracting authorities and even procurement 
bodies the authority to adopt FinTech (and RegTech). Most procurement law at the 
international, regional, and local level already allows for e-procurement.208 Government 
authorities in the past may have had significant difficulties adopting the regulation and 
working practices needed for such e-procurement.209  The complexities of regulating 
FinTech look far more daunting than the simple e-procurement tasks put in place in the 
past. If contracting agencies can require bidders to submit documents electronically only, 
can they not also require bids on blockchains?210 Can they require disclosures on 
distributed ledgers which may involve proprietary standards or unknown security 
standards? Can they require the adoption of the tokenization which allows titles to assets, 
consignment chains and other forms of possession and ownership to pass online under 
cryptographic lock-and-key?211  
 
Legislators might adopt FinTech-friendly provisions in their national legislation.212 First, 
such amendments may consist of a simple yes or no as to whether procuring bodies can 
use blockchains, distributed ledgers, smart contracts, and/or tokens. The wide-spread use 
of FinTech in the public sector represents a political decision, which voters should have a 
right to shape.213 Second, some jurisdictions may even include a “right to innovate” 
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online. 
principle into their procurement laws.214 Such provisions could help contracting agencies 
adopt FinTech solutions, without overly worrying about getting in trouble or sued. Third, 
such laws may force FinTech applications to include “break points.”215 Such break points 
‘let the law in’ by stopping automated routines and smart contracts at points where 
humans may try to negotiate or seek remedies and redress for wrongs committed by these 
applications and their writers/operators. Fourth, provisions for -- or a separate law on - 
digital platforms would also help secure the type of FinTech ecosystems previously 
described.216  
  
Such law may include more specific provisions related to setting up FinTech-enabled 
public procurement. First, such legislation may define the rights and limits of “guided 
sandboxes.”217 Such sandboxes represent specific procurements where contracting 
authorities could use FinTech-related technologies on a limited basis within the confines 
of a specific tender. Second, these laws may regulate how public entities use their new-
found banking powers -- to the extent financial law does not cover these entities.218 Third, 
to the extent centralized bodies do not have the authority to make regulation, legislation 
can create them and give them powers.  
 
Authorities besides financial regulators should regulate parts of FinTech’s 
development. Few doubt the role that financial regulators must play -- particularly for 
FinTech applications used exclusively in the private sector and/or as a substitute for 
traditional finance.219 Few experts have concrete proposals for exactly how such 
regulation should occur -- or even over what kinds of transactions and networks they 
would occur over.220 Even concrete proposals on offer -- like allowing the US  
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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to regulate FinTechs -- remain highly 
controversial.221 Given such an uncertain regulatory environment, governments should 
open up regulatory competencies to other agencies which FinTech applications affect. 
Central procurement bodies, to the extent they make policy or have a voice in the way 
that procurement finance develops, should have a seat at that regulatory table.   
 
A central procurement body or ancillary services provider could draft specific rules 
for the use of each FinTech technology. For example, outlining the procedures used for 
communication between government bodies and bidders in a competitive dialogue -- or 
the extent to which smart contracts may be defined into a negotiated procedure.222  
Such a body could even serve to develop the FinTech and/or RegTech applications for 
use across government.223 Yet, any government-encouraged FinTech supporting services 
for public procurement would likely raise the same concerns as already existing digital 
marketplaces and solutions.224 The central body could even police policy -- such as 
contracting authorities which try disguising certain types of awards or winners.225 Most 
important, though, such a body could deliberate on when to not regulate -- given the 
Innovation Trilemma.226 
 
Such a central body could focus on developing common FinTech and regulatory 
standards. Simple examples -- such as the common procurement vocabulary (CPV) -- 
show the importance and difficulty of establishing standards. The Pan-European Public 
Procurement Online project has saved up to $50 million by encouraging the use of 
common technical standards inside as well as outside the EU.227 The body could ensure 
standardization across government -- from inter-operable blockchains and smart contracts, 
to the automatic payment of purchase orders.228 Such an entity could also serve as a 
counterpart in international negotiations over FinTech-related standards in generalized 
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procurement policies world-wide.229 Such a body could also oversee the procurement-
related aspects of regulation adopting the UNCITRAL-related work on trade finance.230  
 
Some or complete independence from government may serve as one way of ensuring 
that a FinTech-enabled public procurement regulator or think tank would avoid the 
dangers of giving anti-competitive state aid.231 Such a body could consist of a supervisory 
board consisting of politicians, civil servants, businesspersons, technical experts (in 
finance and technology) and NGO representatives. The extent of such independence 
remains an open question -- as even supposedly independent regulators like the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission -- have a decidedly pro-government, enforcement 
bent.232 
 
Preventing a Free-For-All in International Procurement Standards   
 
The Promise of FinTech in Revitalizing Government-to-Government Procurement 
 
If FinTech promises to facilitate public procurement domestically, the benefits for cross-
border procurement seem even greater. FinTech innovations like public blockchains --
and a way to mine them for data -- could finally shed light on this little understood 
sector.233 Many cite the EU’s 2011 figure of about $1 billion in international 
procurements covered by the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).234 
Roughly 33% of international trade involves some kind of bank-intermediated trade 
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finance.235 Yet, by some rough-and-ready measures, the costs of arranging such finance 
(at least in the EU) come to about one-fourth the benefits.236 The significant costs of trade 
finance impede international trade.237  
 
FinTech could significantly lower the costs of cross-border trade and government 
procurement. Most international trade involves sending costly documentary evidence 
proving that buyers have the money to pay for shipments, and sellers have the goods to 
ship. Recent estimates find that traders use letters of credit and other documentary 
collections in roughly 15% of global exports.238 The significant effect that export 
insurance plays in promoting trade clearly shows that traders have problems financing 
trade and insuring such finance.239 FinTech-enabled procurement solutions could easily 
share blockchain and distributed ledger information to international parties.240 The 
tokenization of assets could reduce information and transaction costs.241   
 
New FinTech-related law could also revitalize international efforts to simplify the law 
covering such trade. Over 80% of responding firms noted constraints on trade finance due 
to regulations or policies which FinTech could address.242 Many countries -- given their 
failure to adopt some multilateral treaties that facilitate international trade and 
procurement -- often offer export credits instead.243 These credits serve as the 
international equivalent of state aid in the EU context - making cross-border procurement 
less fair and profitable.  
 
Left to their own devices, many countries would rather slow down - rather than speed up 
-- the adoption of measures in treaties like the Government Procurement Agreement 
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(GPA).244 At the very least, technical norms which make financing international 
procurement easier could encourage the development of more hard law and, thus, more 
international procurement.245 The most optimistic vision of FinTech sees technical 
standards completely replacing the need for law -- in effect doing for trade finance what 
technology did for international telephony.246 
 
Could FinTech Breath New Life into International Procurement Law?  
 
The major international agreements encouraging cross-border public procurement take 
a mixed view of e-procurement. The GPA encourages e-procurement in principle - but 
talks mainly about interoperability and data security.247 In effect then, the GPA offers far 
less encouragement of cross-border procurement than the EU Directives. Yet, “the GPA 
has direct implications  for investment policy and for domestic economic reforms, and is 
an important tool of e-commerce.”248 The UNCITRAL Model Law on Public 
Procurement (the basis for many international organizations’ procurement regulations 
and for many countries) only mentions that advances in information technology 
represents a reason for updating the Model Law.249 Electronic reverse auctions represent 
the only other serious mention of information technologies in the Model Law.250 Nothing 
in the World Bank’s confusing set of documents comprising its Procurement Framework 
seems to mention anything about electronic procurement.251 Even its high level advice to 
member countries seems silent on the subject.252 At least the EBRD has sought advice on 
changing the ways it procures, specifically looking to build FinTech into its broader way 
of doing business.253   
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No procurement treaty can work without the liberalization of the financial services that 
make such FinTech-enabled public procurement possible. In this sense, progress on the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (and especially financial services) must occur 
with progress on the GPA.254 Progress on financial sector liberalization under the 
Agreement (or GATS) and other agreements like Trade in Services Agreements and other 
regional agreements has proceeded falteringly.255 The use of prudential carve-outs and 
plain-old footdragging has continued to the point where any serious liberalization of 
cross-border FinTech services only looks likely to occur either in preferential trade areas 
or bilaterally.256 If countries lived up to their GPA commitments (much less their other 
commitments under regional and multilateral trade agreements) -- the trade in financial 
services would increase.257 Yet, in order to create an international FinTech-enabled 
procurement market, regulators must tackle rulemaking in the finance as well as 
procurement fields.258 
 
If FinTech affects international law, such effects will take place on a contract-by-contract 
basis. In theory, international agreements do not forbid (or even necessarily discourage) 
the use of technologies and electronic means.259 Yet, if cross-border parties to a public 
procurement wish to use FinTech apps, their contracting terms will likely need to specify 
such use. Such a case-by-case basis for FinTech’s use gives rise to a potential FinTech 
free-for-all. As long as nothing prohibits FinTech’s use in contracting, procuring entities 
and foreign suppliers can offer, require and use any FinTech applications they desire. 
 
Such a free-for-all would discourage the development of a principles-based multi-lateral 
public procurement system in three ways. First, the lack of common standards for 
blockchains will slow down the accession of some of the lesser developed countries 
acceding to the GPA. Lesser developed countries often tend to just copy other countries’ 
standards, and adopt the most popular standard. Lack of such popular standards would 
keep these countries in a state-of-waiting. Second, keeping FinTech-related standards in 
contracts -- while certainly in line with the philosophy of international donor 
organizations -- would do little to build minimum standards in international law.260 Both 
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used by international aid and finance organizations) both seek to rely on borrower’s own procurement 
the GPA and GATS favour the kind of multilateralism - through the use of most favoured 
nation (MFN) rules -- that would encourage the adoption of the least restrictive rules 
when using FinTech in government procurement.261 A contract-by-contract approach to 
adopting FinTech in public procurement would thus deprive some countries from 
benefiting from potentially advantageous FinTech-related terms that others have adopted. 
Third, if donors like the World Bank decide to pursue FinTech aggressively, they risk 
reintroducing ‘minimum standards’ into procurement which they have tried to swear off 
for years. The vacillation between using recipient country rules and a donor’s rules has 
made international procurement more complex - and sometimes even led to complete 
project failure.262 The European Development Fund’s rules on recipient countries’ 
procurements have - in some cases - hampered (rather than encouraged) the development 
of local procurement systems.263  
 
Such a free-for-all would have FinTech-enabled public procurement legal standards 
developing in a relative vacuum. FinTechs -- because they operate online and thus easily 
across national borders -- should need to, at least, announce which regulator they fall 
under.264 Even such a minimum standard would have its opponents (in that the FinTechs 
themselves prefer the lightest regulatory touch possible). Similarly, establishing national 
jurisdiction may prove impossible for crypto-assets transferred electronically according 
to rules in one jurisdiction which apply to goods in another jurisdiction.265 At a bare 
minimum, regulators should adopt law which ensures the adherence to principles like the 
rule of law, transparency, and proportionality.266 
 
Chinese FinTech and Belt-and-Road Based Procurement as a Threat to Established 
Procurement Principles?  
 
China’s advances in both FinTech and cross-border procurement make her rules and 
practices particularly influential world-wide. Governments use both their financial 
systems and international procurement to advance their national interests and domestic 
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policies.267 Yet, China’s head start in FinTech makes her laws and market practices 
particularly influential.268 Not only does FinTech adoption in China exceed that by value 
than any other market, but Chinese investment in foreign FinTech ventures gives the 
country an international presence unrivalled by the EU and US.269 China’s highly 
developed FinTech ecosystem will make using other forms of finance in Chinese public 
procurements less and less practical.270 
 
Chinese officials have already promised/threatened to speed up the Fintechization of 
public procurement internationally.271 The Belt and Road Initiative represents $4-$8 
trillion in cross-border procurements (namely, Chinese government entities buying 
foreign companies’ goods or foreign governments buying Chinese companies’ 
services).272 Only about 40% of countries with Belt and Road Initiatives agreements have 
procurement provisions in place.273  Anyway, 60% of Chinese companies end up winning 
these tenders - with procurements done according to much looser rules that those in the 
West.274 The Chinese Government Procurement Law and the related Implementation 
Rules provide that Chinese public procurement facilitates the achievement of goals 
designated by state policies.275, Plans, like the 2019’s Peoples Bank of China’s FinTech 
Development Plan could easily interpret procurement as part of their remit.276 
 
China’s influence in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) could further 
cement international procurement rules’ evolution toward those more similar to Chinese 
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rules, rather than those in the West.277 Many have seen the AIIB’s lending as part of 
China’s broader ambitions to expand its financial services and other markets abroad.278 
One can easily imagine China’s FinTech rules following their FinTech firms world-
wide.279 As such, if China’s FinTech hubs create FinTech standards which large 
organizations like China Development Bank or AIIB adopt, one could imagine a large 
number of countries (and even the US or EU) ‘receiving’ such rules from abroad - rather 
than developing them domestically/internally.280 
 
Much international aid passes through types of public procurement rules which 
encourage a free-for-all approach to cross-border FinTech-enabled public 
procurement.281 Chinese rules take a laissez-faire approach to FinTech development at 
home and abroad - with state policy encouraging the adoption of Chinese standards. 
Western multilateral aid organizations (as previously discussed) aim to use local 
procurement regulations wherever possible. Banks and other procurement/trade finance 
providers will, in turn, use the resulting procurements rules at home and abroad.282 Until 
some form of international law comes into place, such finance rules literally take place 
according to a low bar set by aid organizations’ anti-fraud and audit standards.283  
 
In theory, FinTech markets could spontaneously evolve the rules needed to guard against 
such a free for all. Automated procedures in blockchain and smart contracts could add 
large-scale efficiencies to procurements done by often incompetent or corrupt 
procurement officials.284 Both blockchains and the information provided from the trade of 
tokens (be they tokens over the consignment rights to cargo to the ownership of a 
securitized asset) can help ensure aid recipients distribute aid money for its intended 
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purposes and actually spent for those purposes.285 Specifically, and the point bares 
quoting in its whole, “the use of smart contracts in government procurement processes 
will also require the clarification of liability issues…and interoperability issues will need 
to be addressed before parties to the WTO GPA can put in place such systems”286  If true, 
financial technologies will drive international - as well as - national law in FinTech-
enabled public procurement. 
 
If China does establish the standards under which FinTech-enabled international 
procurements occur, such standards may - themselves - represent an unfair barrier to 
internationbal trade.287 To that end, an international body -- replacing the Financial 
Stability Board’s (FSB) current de facto role -- should oversee and ensure that FinTech 
regulations promote a level procurement playing field.288 Public procurement authorities 
have no obvious forum for harmonizing their policies -- like the FSB or WTO.289 
Disagreements about principles all parties agree might stem from lack of a forum where 
such disagreements could receive a fair hearing.290 Just like national authorities could 
usefully include procurement officials in their FinTech debates, international bodies 
could do likewise.  
 
Such a body should not simply attach to an existing international financial organization. 
Simply creating a FinTech procurement financing working group at the FSB, BIS or 
OECD would again downplay the important role played by trade finance experts and 
procuring entity experts themselves. The General Agreement on Procurement (GPA) has 
no permanent secretariat -- and the GPA does not look at finance issues closely.291 If the 
World Customs Organization, or even the International Telecommunications Union, 
could get their own standing international organization, why does international 
procurement still lack such importance? Why not establish an International Public 
Procurement Authority? Figuring out how to establish a FinTech-enabled procurement 
regime which promotes the procurement finance domestically and internationally could 
represent one of its first -- and most important -- tasks. If banks really do disappear (as 
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Satoshi Nakamoto said), such an authority could best figure out how procurement finance 




How would public procurement change, if major FinTech applications came to work as 
advertised or promoted by their most optimistic supporters? This paper looks at the four 
major FinTech applications that could change the way that public procurement 
information and finance move across transactions. Distributed ledger technologies 
(including blockchains), smart contracts and tokenization increasingly place real-world 
processes onto the internet. Such FinTech-enabled public procurement could make 
government/public buying easier, faster, cheaper, and more transparent. Yet, unmanaged, 
they could allow for gross violations of public procurement law. Such violations could 
result in a domestifc and international free-for-all, where contracting authorities procure 
as they will. Such a free-for-all would certainly jeopardize the principles of equal 
treatment, non-discrimination, proportionality, and transparency, which have helped 
safeguard the public interest.  
 
Such a public interest (and its corollaries in procurement principles) needs to guide the 
development of FinTech for public procurement. Yet, the current haphazard 
procurements of FinTech -- rather than principled procurement by FinTech -- does little 
to move FinTech or public procurement forward. The international organizations, 
wanting to be seen as doing something, distort markets in Fintech innovation and overly 
push FinTech regulation into the arms of financial regulators. Worse still, these 
procurements do little to uphold or build upon existing procurement principles enshrined 
in national and international law.   
 
The current strategy of letting a thousand flowers bloom will result in such a free-for-all. 
In this free-for-all, contracting authorities will disadvantage future FinTechs, harm the 
beneficiaries of public spending, and potentially lock-in FinTech-based financing 
technologies which discriminate, harm disproportionately some, and hide public spending 
in a black box of inscrutable algorithms. Bespoke regulatory or supervisory technologies 
can not simply pair up with bespoke FinTech applications - as such technologies lack the 
kind of guidance that has served traditional supervision for the past century or longer. 
Changes to national law (particularly administrative law affecting central government and 
the wider public sector), and work from FinTech associations and advocates in 
procurement policy bodies will need to guide the development of FinTech-enabled public 
procurement. Procurement policymakers will need to join the panoply of other interested 
regulators (most notably financial regulators) to create FinTech applications which 
benefit all. Few areas of trade finance and broader financial regulation will remain 
untouched. Hopefully, their regulators will also be similarly revolutionized 
(disintermediated).   
 
The changes FinTech could cause in cross-border public procurements could also drag 
along changes in the international law governing them. The Agreement on Government 
Procurement, the range of UNCITRAL Model Laws (most notably the one on public 
procurement) and the regulations governing procurement financed by multi-lateral donor 
agencies, all struggle with even adopting e-procurement. Introducing FinTech-based 
finance into international law will probably require a body dedicated to dragging cross-
border procurement finance into the 21st century. Such a body could advise, help set 
standards, and rein in the free-for-all currently taking place between international 
organizations and nation-states.  
 
China poses particular risks to a global procurement legal order based on level-playing-
field legal principles. China’s lead in FinTech and cross-border government procurement 
-- according to rules aimed at promoting China’s interest rather than the global general 
interest - represent something an international body focused on FinTech-enabled public 
procurement law could look at. If China sets the rules for the next century’s law 
governing the use of FinTech in public procurement, these rules should ensure adherence 
to the principles which have grown trade and growth up to now.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
